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This dissertation investigates the existence of abnormal returns in a sample of 48 banks 
following credit rating changes done by S&P to those banks and to their sovereigns – a total 
of 10 countries – between 2008 and 2012. We analyse three types of effects: first, bank 
rating changes’ impact on its own stock price; second, sovereign rating downgrades’ impact 
on banks’ stock prices (national and foreign); third, bank rating downgrades’ impact on non-
downgraded banks’ equity prices. The impacts are seldom significant: a departure from 
existing literature that may result from the usage of a test statistic robust to cross-correlation 
and event-induced volatility effects, or from time series differences. 
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Cette étude concerne l’effet que les changements de notes donnés par S&P ont dans 
un échantillon de 48 banques et ses souverains (10 pays), entre 2008 et 2012. On explore 
trois effets: d'abord les changements de notes d'une banque ont dans le prix de son action; 
les abaissements de note souveraine ont dans les prix des actions des banques nationales 
et étrangères; troisièmement les abaissements de note d’une banque ont dans des autres 
banques qui n’ont pas eu abaissés. Les résultats sont rarement significatifs: une différence 
comparativement à d'autres études qui peut découler de l’utilisation d’une statistique de test 
robuste en corrélation entre les actions et la variance résultants de l’évènement, ou de 
différences entre les périodes en analyse. 
Mots-clés : Étude d’évènement, prix des actions, banques, notes de souverains, notes 






A presente dissertação investiga a existência de retornos anormais numa amostra de 
48 bancos como resposta a mudanças de notação (rating) feitas pela S&P aos bancos em 
causa ou às respectivas dívidas nacionais – num total de 10 países – entre 2008 e 2012. 
Exploramos três tipos de efeitos: reacção no preço da acção de um banco cuja dívida tenha 
sofrido um corte de notação; reacção no preço de acção de bancos no próprio país e no 
estrangeiro em resposta a uma descida na notação de dívida soberana; reacção no preço 
de acção de bancos cujo rating não tenha sido alterado, em resposta a alterações de 
notação noutros bancos. Na maioria dos casos, estes efeitos não são significativos: uma 
diferença comparativamente a estudos nesta área que pode ser explicada pela utilização de 
uma metodologia e estatística de teste robustas a correlação entre acções e a aumentos de 
volatilidade causados pelo próprio evento, ou pela utilização de um período de análise 
diferente. 
Palavras-chave: Estudo de evento, preço de acção, bancos, notação soberana, 
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The “Word of the Year” choices for the past few years illustrate ironically and almost 
perfectly the status quo of the Advanced World and how its Economy has been evolving, 
demonstrating as well the part it has come to play in common citizens’ everyday life. In the 
United States, the subprime mortgage crisis, arguably one of the roots of today’s malaises, 
became notorious for the general public at the onset of crisis – with “Subprime” being voted 
Word of the Year in 2007. The following winner was “Bailout”, a reflection of how the situation 
unravelled in the country: Bear Stearns had to be bailed out by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York in March 2008; Lehman Brothers had the opposite fate and filed for bankruptcy in 
September, out of Federal Reserve’s moral hazard fears following another bailout. 
Meanwhile in Europe, “Financial Crisis” (2008), “Stress test” (2011) and “Rescuing Routine” 
(2012) won the German Wort des Jahres; “Debt” was chosen in France (2010), “Austerity” 
(2011) in Portugal, “Crisis” (2012) in Italy, to give examples. In the United Kingdom, the most 
voted word in 2012 was “Omnishambles (noun, informal): a situation that has been 
comprehensively mismanaged, characterized by a string of blunders and miscalculations” – a 
quite accurate definition of the times we are living now. 
Appendix 1 on page 44 shows some of the consequences: in the case of two major 
economic blocs – the United States and the European Union – the crisis has affected 
investors (with a decline in stock markets from 2007 to 2010 and values in 2012 still below 
pre-crisis level), households (the Gross National Income in nominal prices declined in the 
United States in 2009; countries such as Greece and Ireland registered sharp declines since 
2007) and States (increasing financing costs data). While these figures are illustrative, they 
do not exhaust the consequences of this episode. 
The crisis is far from over and it may entail future regulatory, systemic and 
governmental changes; because the Economy seems to be recovering slowly (and in many 
countries continues to decline), it continues to be a widely debated topic. The implications for 
some sectors are critical, and Banking is definitely one of them: banks are at the core of 
6 
 
every advanced economy through their many roles in the Economy, namely in creating 
money and facilitating monetary exchanges. 
Another widely debated topic in recent years is that of credit ratings and the role of 
credit rating agencies in the Economy, but especially their action in this crisis. They have 
been accused of inflating ratings in securities in the subprime bubble, but also of rushing 
credit downgrades for corporates and, most importantly, sovereigns, in more recent years – 
sometimes creating domino effects and possibly self-fulfilling prophecies, as we will discuss. 
One question that arises, then, is how market participants interpret the information 
conveyed by credit ratings and what impacts they cause. It is of utmost importance to 
understand what happened in the past to prevent (or exploit) future downfalls in the future; 
Praemonitus praemunitus. 
Combining these two ramifications of banking and credit ratings, in this dissertation we 
will try to quantify the effects of credit rating changes in a sample of American and European 
banks with systemic importance. With an event-study methodology, we will look at credit 
rating changes from Standard and Poor’s Rating Services (henceforth S&P) to the banks 
included in the sample as well as their sovereigns, to establish whether or not there is a 
market impact2. In the case of firms’ rating changes, we will analyse the impact on the bank 
being downgraded and on other banks; with sovereign rating changes, we will observe 
reactions in banks’ equity prices. We hope that a comparison between these effects sheds 
some academic light on the contagion effect anecdotally present in the press. 
We follow (Hartmann, Straetmans, & De Vries, 2005) and focus on equity prices 
assuming that they reflect information about asset and liability risk as well as interbank risk 
(which can be manifested through investment correlation, interbank lending or other means). 
As these authors argue, working with equity prices allows us to avoid one of the 
complications in banking system studies, which is the fact that connections between banks 
                                               
2
 (Reisen & von Maltzan, 1999), (Brooks, Faff, Hillier, & Hillier, 2004) show that these are the 
least anticipated and have the greatest impact on market returns. 
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may act as a source of contagion; moreover, the parameters of these links are not easily 
determinable. As Jorion & Zhang (2007) also point out, equity markets are more liquid – a 
helpful property in this type of studies. Our rationale is to validate anecdotal evidence of 
contagion effects in the financial crisis and quantify them. 
To the best of our knowledge, few studies focus on intra-industry effects relying on 
equity price changes when it comes to credit rating changes. There are studies on some of 
the issues we will be addressing, but not always up to date – and when discussing rating 
changes, the conclusions may change quickly depending on the time period considered. By 
combining elements of different studies and using recent data, we hope to provide a fresh, 
enlightened insight on the Banking sector – from the point of view of investors, with 
implications to managers. 
This discussion will now continue with an overview of existing literature on this topic as 
well as a highlight of relevant results to contrast with ours later on the study. Subsequently, 
we will present our methodology, including a description of the sample and the rationale for 
its choice. Then, we will present and discuss our results, validating or rejecting our initial 
hypotheses. We will then conclude with some comments on the limitations of our study and 
possibilities for further research. 
II. Literature review 
We will start the literature review with a discussion of the financial system and its 
impact on the real economy side, to establish the importance of studying banking impacts. 
We then look at the subject of contagion, which would be an interest of our study if rating 
changes prove to cause widespread impacts on banks. We then turn to the main focus of this 
dissertation – credit ratings. 
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The interaction between finance and the real economy 
One important element of literature to review and understand is that of the financial 
system’s implications in the real economy – from the moment this relation exists, 
understanding the Banking sector becomes of foremost value. Because this is an area which 
has been comprehensively studied by many authors and not the main subject of this 
dissertation, I will rely on two influential authors to recapitulate existing literature. 
An early revision can be found in Gertler (1988), who discusses the several emphases 
given to the topic over history. At the time of the Great Depression in 1929, analysing the role 
of the financial system in economic activity came to the forefront of academic work; money 
and credit supply were the main focus when discussing finance then. Another strand of 
research came with the discussion of firms’ financial structure and its unimportance in 
financing decisions (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). In the 1970s, money supply – particularly 
unexpected changes – was again discussed; financial markets were under study, more than 
the financial system itself. A discussion on the relation between consumers' spending and 
their financial situation ensued, as well as the role of monetary forces in driving economic 
growth. 
A change came with the new topic of information asymmetry, which quickly came to 
dominate financial system studies: both equity and debt markets can be affected by its 
opacity and there are difficulties investors and lenders face in evaluating counterparty risk. 
The general implication of these studies is that financing (and, consequently, the financial 
system) does matter to explain investment and other real economic variables: financial 
intermediaries may help solving information distortion issues. Subsequently, Fama (1980) 
and (1985) – both devoted to studying financial institutions as intermediaries – conclude that 
banks may be particularly efficient in reducing asymmetry. A prominent model, Diamond 
(1984) shows how an intermediary can save on monitoring efforts connecting savers to 
borrowers and facilitating investment; it was the acceptance of the role of banks as monitors. 
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A consequence of these studies is, then, the role of regulation towards financial 
institutions. Authors such as Diamond & Dybvig (1983) and Friedman & Schwartz  (1986) 
proposed scenarios where governmental intervention was still needed; Diamond and Dybvig 
are particularly incisive in explaining bank runs and spawned much work in avoiding liquidity 
crunches; Bhattacharya & Gale (1987) advocate the role of the government as a provider of 
subsidized liquidity protection when financial institutions fail to secure it. Related to this issue, 
Bernanke and Gertler propose a model that underlines the importance of bank capital, which 
delineates the level of bank credit granted - consequently impacting investment and real 
growth. 
Before concluding, Gertler dealt with the subject of financial structure; borrowing 
constraints, as evidenced by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) or interest rates, explored by 
Farmer (1985) can contribute to economic cycles’ determination, as can companies' ability to 
issue equity, presented by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986). 
Levine (1997) offers another comprehensive review of literature on this topic, at times 
with a different point of view than Gertler. Levine focusses his review on five purposes of 
financial systems, namely: risk management; resource allocation; reducing agency costs; 
pooling savings; arranging a payments system. Levin also focusses on two channels to affect 
output - "capital accumulation and technological innovation" (p. 691). The general conclusion 
is that financial systems and intermediaries can lead to economic growth. In a more recent 
study, Levine (2005) revisits his earlier work and provides additional insights on how Finance 
impacts the real economy – not only on aggregate terms, but also when it comes to income 
distribution.  
To conclude this section, as we have seen there is an extensive literature on the 
interaction between financial intermediaries and economic growth to show how strongly they 




The topic of financial contagion has spurred more interest recently than that of banking 
and growth; according to Claessens and Forbes (2004), “contagion” only started to be 
associated with Finance, as opposed to Medicine, after the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 and 
especially the 1997 currency crisis in Thailand (p.1). However, the literature is just as 
extensive – because defining contagion is a troublesome task and it can be the very first 
challenge in this research area: its study and interpretation depends largely on the 
methodology used. 
On its website, the World Bank defines three vague types of contagion: “broad”, 
“restrictive” and “very restrictive”. The first and broader definition encompasses cross-border 
diffusion of shocks, whether they are positive or negative, although the latter tends to be 
privileged; the second emphasizes the abnormal (that is, beyond explanation) effect of these 
shocks; other names include “excess co-movement”; the third and narrower definition refers 
to the phenomenon of correlation jumps during crises when compared to normal times. While 
these distinctions are illustrative and somehow used, as pointed out in Dungey & Tambakis 
(2005), they are still fairly general; thus, many authors have tried to review what has been 
investigated on the subject of contagion and the definitions set forth, providing more precise 
differentiations. 
We will now continue with further discussion of alternative definitions for contagion, of 
possible reasons for contagion to occur and also why contagion is more likely to succeed in 
banks than in other firms, in an attempt to establish the relevance of our study. 
Alternative definitions 
In A Primer on Financial Contagion, (Pericoli & Sbracia, 2003) identify five recurrently 
used definitions of contagion. Starting by the first definition, Pericoli and Sbracia propose 
“Contagion is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one country, conditional on 
a crisis occurring in another country” (p. 9). The second is presented as “Contagion occurs 
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when volatility spills over from the crisis country to the financial markets of other countries” 
(p. 580); since, as the authors point out, volatility is usually associated with market 
uncertainty, this definition can be interpreted as a “spread of uncertainty”. The third definition 
states that “Contagion is a significant increase in co-movements of prices and quantities 
across markets, conditional on a crisis occurring in one market or group of markets” (p. 581). 
The fourth characterization is proposed as “(Shift)-contagion occurs when the transmission 
channel is different after a shock in one market” (p. 581). The fifth and final definition is 
“Contagion occurs when co-movements cannot be explained by fundamentals” (p. 581). This 
is also the definition proposed on Forbes and Rigobon (2002). 
Since there are arguments for and against each usage, in practice authors start by 
stating in their studies what their approach to contagion will be, avoiding confusions but also 
giving rise to more studies on this subject (with different points of view). Depending on the 
definition, the explanations for contagion to occur and the propagation channels can be 
slightly different, as we will now discuss. 
Explanations for contagion 
Claessens and Forbes discuss some explanations in International Financial Contagion: 
The Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications (2004), focussing on a broad definition which 
assumes that cross-country spillovers are contagion even if these countries are in the same 
geographic area and have meaningful links in stable periods. They then list three 
fundamental causes and five theories that rely instead on investors’ behaviour. 
Among the fundamentals, the first group of causes would be a “common or global 
shock” (p.5), such as price changes of commodities, interest or currency rates adjustments – 
shocks that “can lead to increased co-movements in asset prices and capital flows” (p.5). A 
second group would be “trade linkages” (p.5), whether through direct trade or competitive 
devaluation actions, which can affect several countries at once and result in an overall effect 
which is larger than what the fundamentals would cause. The third group of fundamental 
12 
 
causes is “financial linkages” (p.6), which results from integrated financial markets and can 
happen through credit supply or capital flow changes – more severe for countries dependant 
on external funds. 
In the field of investors’ behaviour explanations, Claessens and Forbes identify five 
main theories, all showing how individually rational actions can add up to aggregate shifts 
that go beyond the fundamentals. The first concerns the “role of liquidity problems” (p.6), 
which Valdés (1997) and Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2001) have studied: after losing 
in one market and to be able to fulfil their financial obligations, investors may be forced to sell 
assets in other markets; after losing in one country, banks may be forced to sell assets in 
other countries to reduce their overall risk exposure. The more exposed these parties are, 
especially due to leverage, the more they will try to compensate their losses and potentially 
spill the losses across markets. A second, related group explains how “incentive structures 
and changes in risk aversion” (p.7) – studied by Schinasi and Smith (2001) and Broner, 
Gelos and Reinhart (2004) – can lead investors to sell an asset class which is overweight 
(when compared to their benchmark) as a result of losses in another asset class; if many 
investors share a similar benchmark, there can be a substantial downward pressure on 
prices or currency depreciation. A third set of theories is based on asymmetry of information 
and how problems in one country may indicate that another country will suffer as well, 
leading investors to sell, sometimes to mimic what others who apparently have more 
information and have done so, as Calvo and Mendoza (1998) and Agénor and Aizenman 
(1998) illustrate. A fourth set, analogous to a bank run, reflects how investors may rush to 
sell an asset out of fear to have their foreign positions claimless – Jeanne (1997), Masson 
(1998) and Chang and Majnoni (2001) have developed such theories; this explanation of 
contagion can be difficult to distinguish from fundamentals theories, since fundamentals may 
be at the heart of investors’ behaviour. Finally, investors may act out of a “reassessment of 
the rules under which international financing takes place” (p.9), believing that a particular 
country will/will not be assisted in case of trouble and trying to limit their losses. 
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Banks and contagion 
In the widely cited and referred work of Kaufman (1994), the author discusses intra-
industry spillovers – impacts of firms in their peers – and how this phenomenon is more 
prone to be witnessed in Banking than other sectors. 
More recently, in Allen and Carletti (2012), the literature on contagion is explained and 
reviewed, to emphasize how banks are especially vulnerable to shocks. According to the 
authors, two main theoretical strands of research exist: one main approach focusses on 
direct linkages in banks, while the other focusses on indirect balance-sheet connections. 
Additionally, there are empirical studies on contagion when financial institutions fail. 
In general, and as we have seen, banks – as financial system intermediaries – play 
several roles in the Economy; their preponderance, their many links, is what makes them so 
predisposed to contagion. 
Credit Ratings 
Standard & Poor’s, on its website, proposes the following definition of credit ratings: 
“Credit ratings are forward-looking opinions about credit risk. Standard & Poor’s credit 
ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a 
corporation or state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in full and on time.” 
(Standard and Poor's, 2013) 
For the value of the information they convey, they have been the source of many 
studies – especially when it comes to rating changes and the added information they bring to 
the market. 
The importance of ratings 
Ratings represent a substantial saving of time and effort looking for information in a 
particular security: they summarize quantitative and qualitative information about the debt 
issuer and convey a risk profile. Whether they provide new insights or only on publicly 
available information is a topic of debate and fundamental to understand the impact it may 
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have on stock prices. In any case, they help marketing a security and have played an 
increasingly important role in the financial innovation of recent years and the financial system 
itself. Some authors showed that firms (though not necessarily banks) may even take capital 
structure decisions to keep a certain rating (Kisgen, 2006). 
Corporate ratings studies 
In an early study, with U.S. corporate observations from 1977 to 1983, Hand, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) examine daily data and find significant average excess stock 
returns following straight debt rating changes, but asymmetric: stronger and more significant 
for downgrades than for upgrades – but they exclude expected rating changes, that is 
additions to the S&P’s Credit Watch list and actual rating changes by S&P and Moody’s. The 
subject had been studied before, but mostly with monthly data. 
Some studies point to the contrary, though: Goh and Ederington (1993) suggest that for 
downgrades, shareholders’ response depends on the type of announcement made by the 
rating agency: if the downgrade follows a decline on the firm’s financing capacity, stock 
prices tend to fall; if the downgrade is motivated by an increase in leverage, there is no 
significant decline on equity prices. 
More recently and for European banks, Gropp and Richards (2001) have found, with 
observations from 1989 to 2000, that for equity prices there are significant responses for 
rating changes (even though the results may be contaminated by other events). They also 
suggest, following Goh and Ederington (1993), that the reason for the rating change is 
important and that a downgrade due to increased capacity may even be faced as good news 
and motivate positive abnormal returns. 
Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) develop a model to explain the role of credit 
ratings, which they propose as “coordination mechanisms”, and defend their importance; 




Sovereign ratings studies 
Sovereign ratings indicate the soundness of state debt and the general conditions of 
the economy, therefore sending strong signals to investors. Borensztein, Cowan and 
Valenzuela, (2007) and Gande and Parsley (2005) discuss how sovereign debt can be a 
benchmark for interest rates in the country, thus impacting firms’ financing conditions; banks 
are therefore particularly concerned by this information. 
While the interest in analysing credit ratings has increased significantly in more recent 
years – especially changes made to sovereign credit –, studies on the topic precede the 
current crisis and the criticism towards the role that rating agencies played. Cantor and 
Packer (1996) were the predecessors of credit rating analysis, focussing on their 
determinants but most innovatively, in their impact. Since then, the studies multiplied and 
lately have been particularly investigated. Some studies focus on concrete issues:  Lee, 
Sapriza, Wu (2010) conclude that sovereign rating changes affect significantly stock liquidity, 
especially downgrades; with a European Union countries sample, Afonso, Gomes, Taamouti 
(2002) show that downgrades have significant impacts on volatility and they cause contagion 
among countries. Others focus on debt or equity markets in general: (Larraín, Reisen, & von 
Maltzan, 1997), (Reisen & von Maltzan, 1999), (Steiner & Heinke, 2001) for bond markets; 
(Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2001), (Brooks, Faff, Hillier, & Hillier, 2004), (Ferreira & Gama, 
2007), (Michaelides, Milidonis, Nishiotis, & Papakyriacou, 2012) for equity markets. All offer 
support for significant reactions to sovereign downgrades, and the latter highlight 
accentuating factors such as financial development, law systems, institutional quality and 
corruption to justify part of the reactions. 
Brooks, Faff, Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) offer a particularly relevant study 
focussing on financial crises, to check if sovereign rating changes destabilize the markets. 
While they conclude that these events have an impact on stock markets, they do not 
heighten financial market instability. 
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Correa, Lee, Sapriza, & Suarez (2012), who focus on the impact on banks, find 
significant results especially for downgrades. For 37 countries, between 1995 and 2011 and 
focussing on the same rating agency (S&P), the authors find that the effect of downgrades is 
stronger for banks more dependent on government support and with higher perceived 
probability to be bailed out. In Europe, where the data is available, the authors additionally 
found that this likelihood of government rescue effect is stronger than the response of banks 
with holdings of domestic government debt. They also find stronger results with larger 
downgrades (at least two notches). 
Additionally, a report by the International Monetary Fund (2010), reviews the 
performance of credit rating agencies, including S&P, and concludes that they do impact 
stock market prices: by conveying new information but, importantly, because of their 
“certification role” (p.85). 
The general conclusion of the literature is that sovereign credit rating changes, 
particularly downgrades, impact the financial markets. 
Rating quality 
One of the strands in ratings literature is that of ratings quality, which Hau, Langfield 
and Marqués-Ibáñez (2012) discuss and we summarize; this discussion is useful to 
understand how credit ratings are given and may point at interesting subjects to analyse. 
A large part of studies in rating quality deals with the problems posed by agency and 
incentive problems. There are three main parties involved in a credit rating evaluation: the 
“consumer”, which is ultimately the investor interested in knowing the worthiness of the 
product they are investing in; the issuer, who wants their debt rated so as to market it 
according to its risk profile; the credit rating agency, who carries out the evaluation. One 
major concern, then, comes from the incentive that issuers have in inducing higher ratings – 
a higher rated product will sell at a higher price; the question was aggravated after 1975, 
when ratings started to be paid by the issuers. There is an upward bias not only when 
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issuers try to engage in “ratings shopping” – approaching several agencies trying to receive a 
better rating –, but also when the prospect of future rating solicitations of a particular issuer 
(and consequently, fees for the agency) is higher, which is the case of larger companies; 
Efing and Marqués-Ibáñez (2012), Griffin and Tang (2011) and He et al (2011) find empirical 
evidence of this latter theory. Additionally, rating agencies have a disproportionate power 
towards their consumers: if issuers do not ask for their ratings, they can assign unsolicited 
ratings, free of charge, but penalizing them with downwards bias (Partnoy, 2002; Fulghieri et 
al, 2010). Another incentive distortion happens with rating-contingent regulation of banks and 
investors (e.g. only investing in investment grade products), who then expect inflated ratings 
on products that, having in fact higher leverage (and risk), allow them to reap short-term 
profits; Calomiris (2009) and Opp et al. (2012) have discussed this question of rating-
contingent regulation and so has Efing (2012), who concludes that even when full credit 
information is available, rating agencies have an incentive to inflate their evaluations to share 
with the clients the prospect of higher revenue. 
Reputational capital, or the long-term interest that agencies have in producing reliable 
and trustworthy assessments, might be a solution for these issues (Cantor and Packer, 1995; 
Covitz and Harrison, 2003). However, its importance varies with business cycles and 
whereas in times of crisis it is more relevant, it loses power in boom periods (Bar-Isaac and 
Shapiro, 2012); other aspects such as uninformed investors (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 
2012) and periods of generalised credit downgrade events (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009) 
exacerbate this cyclicality. 
Moreover, the quality of ratings can be affected by factors other than incentives, 
namely the difficulty in assessing rating quality when businesses are complex – the particular 
case of banking; in this sector, disagreements between agencies are greater than in any 
other (Morgan, 2002). Credit rating agencies have thus a general benefit in issuing lower-
quality ratings than investing resources in scrutinizing complicated businesses (Mathis et al, 




The research questions of our study will then be: 
Q1: Are banks’ equity prices affected by their credit rating changes? Could 
factors such as the country of origin (and its economy) influence the reaction? 
Given the literature discussed above, we expect banks to respond positively for 
upgrades and negatively to downgrades, with greater soundness for the latter – 
on which we intend to focus. As for the country of origin, the literature focusses 
more on the division between emerging and advanced economies or on other 
control variables; therefore, we can only try to guess that distressed countries 
should react more to downgrades than others. 
 
Q2: Are banks’ equity prices affected by sovereign credit rating changes? 
Which factors could influence this effect? 
In light of the literature reviewed, we expect sovereign credit rating changes to 
cause significant abnormal returns to the banks on the sample, which are of 
systemic importance. 
 
Additionally, in an attempt to grasp some bank contagion effect, we will look at the 
effect that bank rating changes have on other banks; however, the literature on this topic is 
scarce (particularly using the equity prices event study methodology). In case there are 
significant effects with downgrades, it would also be interesting to compare the three main 
type (own bank, other bank or sovereign) and see if there are major differences between 
them. 
It is worthwhile mentioning the implications that the results have on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, as proposed by Fama: if the information conveyed by rating changes is new, we 
should expect a significant change in the price as soon as it is known – meaning that the 
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market incorporates almost immediately the new information. In this degree of efficiency, if 
there are no significant abnormal returns, that must mean that the information was not new.  
III. Sample and Methodology 
Sample 
We started by selecting the countries with the objective of gathering a wide yet 
manageable sample that included only advanced countries. The GIIPS countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were of particular interest given the number of credit 
events they have witnessed recently, and were therefore included; to compare them with 
more affluent countries in the Eurozone, we included France and Germany. The United 
States were also a natural choice given our interest in comparing it with Europe. 
Furthermore, to have European countries without the Euro and seemingly less exposed 
markets we included also the United Kingdom and Switzerland, thus putting the total number 
of countries in 10. 
To select the banks, and given that one of our (indirect) goals was to assess the 
financial system’s stability, we looked at stress test reports done in the United States, in the 
European Union and in Switzerland by the competent regulator. Looking at the countries and 
bounded by information availability, we were left with 48 banks to include in the study (a full 
list can be found on Appendix 2, in page 47). 
We retrieved from Bloomberg daily stock prices from 2008 to 2012, in local currency as 
to avoid exchange rate blur, for banks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
France and Germany and Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. The returns were 
calculated as log first differences and the 3-month Libor was used to compute excess 
returns. 
To select the list of events, we used Bloomberg’s Event function after creating a 
portfolio with the list of banks identified, as well as the Sovereign Debt monitor to find 
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sovereign rating changes. We considered only the events whose estimation and event 
window fell within the period of returns (2008-2012). The list of events can be found in 
Appendix 3 – Bank rating changes description (page 49) and Appendix 4 – Sovereign rating 
changes description (page 53); the event clustering is described on Appendix 5 – List of 
event clusters (page 55). 
Methodology 
In our research design we had to take into account some econometric problems 
stemming from the fact that the banks included in the sample are most likely correlated 
(especially those in the same country); moreover, events can induce volatility and increase 
correlation between stock prices – that is, as we discussed, is a major area of research.  As 
(Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010) put it, even when cross-correlation is low, it increases significantly 
with event clustering (same event day for multiple firms) – a problem to which Gande and 
Parsley (2005) also draw attention, since there is event windows contamination. 
While some authors such as Correa, Lee, Sapriza and Suarez (2012) opt for a 
regression approach, we looked at other means to overcome this problem. In particular, we 
look at the test statistics developed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), who propose a test 
statistic adjusted to cross-correlation, adapting the one proposed in Patell (1976), and 
another to deal with both autocorrelation and cross-correlation – an adaptation of the 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (BMP) methodology. According to the authors, this latter 
adjusted statistic – abbreviated to ADJ-BMP – takes into account two major problems in 
event studies in single and multiple-day event windows. Nonparametric tests would also be 
an option, and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) conclude that the Corrado and Zivney (1992) 
nonparametric rank test is comparable in robustness and power to the ADJ-BMP test for 
single-day abnormal returns and short Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) windows. 
However, in longer CAR windows, the ADJ-BMP performs better; since we will CARs, the 




Several possibilities exist for the calculation of the estimated returns, and Kolari and 
Pynnönen propose five: a constant mean model; a market model; an OLS model; the Fama-
French model; the Fama-French Industry Model. In our case, for simplification (since more 
complex models would require a substantial volume of information, time-dependant, for the 
48 banks in the sample), the market model is used to calculate the abnormal returns (ARs) 
as: 
     ( ̂   ̂    )      (1)  
where     is the return of the MSCI World Bank Index (Bloomberg code 
MXWO0BK:IND) on day  ;    and    are obtained for bank   from an estimation window 
regression. The estimation and event periods are defined as follows: 
Figure 1 - Estimation and event window 
 
Let   denote the total number of banks included in the sample (48). Kolari and 
Pynönnen assume, following (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997), that the asset returns of 
the firms (   ) in the sample are “serially independently multivariate normally distributed 
random variables with constant mean and constant covariance matrix for all  ” (p. 3999). 
Calculation of test statistics3 
For the statistical tests, the authors – following Patell (1976) – use scaled abnormal 
returns (SARs), defined as “prediction errors divided by the estimated residual standard 
deviation of the factor model used to define returns” (p. 4000), in this case the market model. 
                                               
3
 The equations here presented rigorously follow the ones presented in (Kolari & Pynnönen, 
2010) but have a slightly different notation for an easier understanding, so that the reader is not forced 
to consult the original paper. 
-20 -10 
Estimation period: -120 to -21 
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If returns are assumed to follow a normal distribution, the SARs follow a           
distribution with       degrees of freedom where   is the number of observations in the 
estimation window (in our case, 100) and   is the number of explanatory variables in the 
estimation model (in our case, 2) – thus, we are dealing with a    -distributed variable. The 
calculation also involves a correction term (  ) for the estimation of the regression 
parameters (  and  ). We then have: 
          
    
  √    
 
(2) 
with    being the standard deviation of the regression residuals and    calculated as 
described in the paper. The SARs, the authors argue, are burdensome to interpret and 
should be used only for detecting the signal of the event effect; the economic information 
should be interpreted from the ARs. 
The test statistics can be done computed under two alternative assumptions. If we 
assume that the securities included in the sample are similarly correlated, the SARs are 
averaged to enter the numerator of the test statistics as: 
 ̅  
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The second element of the test statistics in this first assumption is the variance of the 
average (cross-sectional) SARs –   ̅ 
  –, estimated as: 
  ̅ 
  
∑       ̅  
  
   
   
 
 
   ̅
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 (4) 
where  ̅ is an estimation (based on the estimation period) of the average cross-
correlation between banks. This formula adds to the sample variance two terms that improve 
accuracy, removing a bias resulting from cross-correlation between stocks (which would 
understate the true cross-sectional variance, since the average cross-correlation is positive). 
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This is important because understating the true variance would lead to an easier rejection of 
the null hypothesis (of zero scaled abnormal returns) in  -statistics. 
Alternatively, if we know stocks to be cross-correlated in   blocks with    observations 
each, such that within the block there is cross-correlation but between the blocks there is not, 
the SARs are averaged accordingly. For the SARs cross-sectional variance, we start by 
estimating the variance   ̅  
  in each group   as: 
  ̅  
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where the terms are analogous to those of equation (4), but for block  . The variance 
  ̅ 
  is then estimated as: 
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 In any case, the  -statistic is obtained with equations (3) and (4) or (6) as: 
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In some cases, we compute CARs to capture the effect in a larger period of time (a few 
days); it may be the case that more than one rating change happens in a short period of time 
or that another event occurs and the response, if it exists, is not immediately incorporated 
into the stock price. The test statistics are computed in the same way and since abnormal 





Q1: Banks’ own effect 
To answer the first question of whether or not banks’ stock prices are affected by a 
rating change to their debt, we started by using equations (3), (4) and (7) and compute the 
test-statistics for all the affected banks, regardless of their country or the event date. These 
results are presented in detail on Appendix 6 (page 58) – Panel 6.1; they do not show 
evidence of effects from downgrades. ARs for downgrades are only significant in days -9 and 
+4 (both positive), which does not seem to have a particular reason to occur. The CARs are 
also weak around the event day and no conclusion can be taken. As for upgrades, there is 
evidence of anticipation of the events, since on day -2 there is an abnormal return of 2.87% 
significant at the 5%-confidence level; there is also a positive abnormal return on day +6 
significant at the 5% level. In this case, the CARs are positive and all significant at the 10% 
level in days -2 and -1. 
Since downgrades constitute the bulk of our sample, we used several methodologies 
and subsamples to analyse their impact in more depth, to see if results changed. The 
previous calculations were done for the 200 downgrades identified, but not all of them 
represent an actual rating cut: some are just a negative outlook revision. Since it might be 
the case that outlook revisions do not impact the market, when rating cuts actually do, we 
performed the same calculations only for rating cuts and for cuts of more than one notch. 
On Panel 6.2.A, we used two alternative methodologies in an attempt to improve our 
results: using equations (5) and (6) and aggregating observations in groups of countries 
when computing SARs. This is important because the calculation of the test statistic involves 
an average correlation term and if we take all securities as equally correlated when in fact 
there are blocks with greater cross-correlation than others, that noise is spread to all the 
observations. However, the panel shows that computing the statistics all together or grouping 
them by countries brings little change to the results. 
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Considering only rating cuts, there continue to be no significant ARs on the days close 
to the rating cut date, although the results on day zero do gain some significance. Using then 
only the first methodology (without blocks), we computed the response to rating cuts of at 
least two notches (38 observations), whose results are shown in Panel 6.2.B; no AR or CAR 
is significant. 
These results, however, may hide some national effects; separating the events by 
country yields more interesting results. Panel 6.3 shows the results for the sub-sample of 
rating cuts, with events grouped between countries. 
As we can see, the United Kingdom has significant abnormal returns at the 5% 
confidence level for days -10 (negative) and +10 (positive), and at 10% for day +8 (positive). 
Spain has significant abnormal returns at the in days -10 (negative) and -1 (negative), as well 
as +9 (negative). Ireland has significant abnormal returns on days +3 and +9 (both positive). 
Italy has positive abnormal returns in days -6, -2 and +4 and a negative abnormal return on 
day +1. Greece shows abnormal returns on day -6 and +6 (negative) and on day +4 
(positive). Portugal shows significant but positive abnormal results on day -10 and +8. The 
United States have significant positive returns on day -9, and significant negative on day -8. 
Switzerland has a 1% significant positive return on day +3. France has positive abnormal 
returns on day -2 significant at 10%. Germany could not be analysed separately since it only 
had one observation; moreover, Ireland and Switzerland’s conclusions, resulting from a lower 
number of observations, are not as strong as other countries’. 
The CARs could offer a different view, in case the effect was not immediately 
incorporated in the stock price but instead in a short period of days. However, they are only 
significant for Portugal and France; on France, the returns are even positive, which does not 
have any economic rationale. 
In general, we find some unusual results in days far from the rating change 
announcement, which is not explainable by fundamentals and uncommon in literature; we 
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suspect that this has to do with the fact that in many cases, the corporate announcements 
were preceded by sovereign rating announcements days before or other events; 
contamination is a serious problem in our sample, as Appendix 5 illustrates. Therefore, we 
tried to use a smaller event window of only -5 to +5 days, and CARs from -2 to +2 – 
presented on Panel 6.4. This should impact the results since scaled abnormal returns take 
into account the variance in the event window. 
Using a new event window (again, only for rating cuts) eliminates significant returns 
“far” from the event itself, but downgrades still have no impact on stock prices in any of the 
days. This window seems to be more adequate – the problem of contamination was probably 
diminished. But the main conclusion remains: a rating downgrade does not seem to have an 
impact on the firm’s stock price; significance on ARs seems to increase when we consider 
only rating cuts (but not rating cuts of at least 2 notches), which Correa, Lee, Sapriza and 
Suarez (2012) found to be stronger. 
Q2: Sovereign effect 
In this part, we discuss whether a credit event of a sovereign impacts stocks’ equity 
prices (the second question). Given the composition of our sample, with few upgrades, we 
will focus our analyses exclusively on sovereign downgrades. For each sovereign credit 
event, we observe the reaction it has on the country’s banks and also on other countries’ 
banks. The results using alternative methodologies are presented in detail in Appendix 7. 
Own country effects 
We started our analysis by computing the statistics for each country and came to a 
general result that is composed of each country’s results weighted by the number of 
observations it has, following the two methodologies described earlier; the results are shown 
in Panel 7.1. Looking at downgrades, we can see that they do not have a significant impact 
on the days close to the event – the only significant (at 5%) ARs come in days -10 and +4, 
both positive. Again, there is almost no difference in the results between methodologies. 
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 If we separate the results by country, we get to the results on Panel 7.2 – Germany 
had only one downgrade (in fact, a negative outlook) and the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland had none, thus they could not enter the country analysis; France, Italy and the 
United States, despite their inclusion, had only two. 
Again, we find that there are no significant abnormal returns for banks, as a whole, 
near the event day. Most countries exhibit significant returns at the 5% level only “far” from 
the event day, namely: France, on days -4 (negative) and +4 (positive); Italy, on day -6 
(negative); Portugal, on days -10 and -8 (both positive). The United States has, in addition to 
some strong abnormal returns on days -10 and -8 (positive) and -5 and +9 (negative), some 
abnormal returns closer to the event day: on days -3 and +1, it shows a negative abnormal 
return significant at the 1% level; but we should be careful interpreting these results since, as 
it was mentioned, only two downgrades occurred. 
Cross effects 
We also looked at the effect that a country’s sovereign rating changes have on other 
country’s banks. In this case, we computed abnormal returns and test statistics for a 
country’s banks in the event periods of other countries: thus, the results are summarized in 
six tables (the countries that had more than one downgrade)4. We also repeated the 
calculations for a shorter event window, from -5 to +5, as shown in Panel 7.5. 
Spain 
As we can observe in Panel 7.4.A, a Spanish downgrade seemed to have no sizeable 
impact on Italy and Switzerland. On some countries, significant abnormal returns only 
showed in days far from the event:  France (positive AR on day -7); Germany (negative AR 
on day -4 and positive AR on day +8); Ireland (positive ARs on days -9, -8 and -6); United 
Kingdom (positive AR on day +4); Greece (positive AR on day +8); United States (positive 
AR on day -10). Finally, on Portugal, a Spanish downgrade caused a positive AR on day -1. 
                                               
4
 We included own country results in these tables to allow for a quicker comparison, but the 
results are the same as in Panel 7.2. 
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Looking at the results from a shorter time window, presented in Panel 7.5.A, Italy 
continues to have no response, and now neither do France, Ireland, Greece and the United 
States. The results also uphold for Portugal and to the United Kingdom. Germany no longer 
responds after the event, but only before with negative results on days -4 and -3. 
Ireland 
Ireland does not seem to affect other countries much if we consider the larger event 
window (Panel 7.4.B): France, Italy, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece and the 
United States do not have any significant AR. Portugal has a negative AR on day +7 and 
Switzerland has a positive AR on day +3 and a negative AR on day +5. 
The shorter event window (Panel 7.5.B) maintains the results for Italy and Greece, but 
changes the results for France, where positive ARs are significant on days -4 and +3; 
Germany, where now there are positive ARs on days -5 and -1, as well as a negative AR on 
day +5; Spain, where a significant positive AR appears on days -4 and +3; the United 
Kingdom, with a positive response on day +4; the United States, with a positive response on 
day +4. For Portugal and Switzerland, where there were some response, the results also 
change now. Portugal now shows positive response after the event, with significant ARs on 
days -5, +3 and +4 (positive). For Switzerland, the results uphold: positive response on days 
+3 and +4, but negative on day +5; additionally, a negative response appears two days 
before. 
Italy 
With the larger time window – and the results shown on Panel 7.4.C – Spain shows no 
response to an Italian sovereign downgrade; France and the United Kingdom react positively 
4 days after (5% significance). Some countries show a response only prior to the event: 
Portugal, with a 5% significant negative AR on day -7; Greece, with 5% significant results on 
days -8 (positive) and -7 (negative); the United States with 10% significant positive AR on 
days -8 and -3. Other countries react both before and after: Ireland, with a 1% significant 
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response on day -3 and a 5% significant on day +4, both positive; Germany, with 1% 
significant response on days -8 and +1 and a 10% significant AR on day -1, all positive; 
Switzerland, with positive ARs with 5% significance on day -8 and 1% significance on day +4. 
Considering the shorter time window – and the results shown on Panel 7.5.C –, the 
conclusions uphold for France, for Ireland and for Switzerland (respond positively before and 
after the event) and for Greece and the United States (who respond positively before the 
event), but change for the rest. Portugal no longer has significant ARs; Germany now 
responds before and after, with particularly sound ARs on days +1 and +4, both positive; 
Spain now has a reaction before (10% significance on day -3) and after the event (1% 
significance on day +4), both positive. 
Greece 
Looking at Panel 7.5.D, which uses the larger time window, we can see how some 
countries barely respond to Greek sovereign downgrades. France and Spain only react 
before 6 days the event, both positively; the United States only responds 9 days after, also 
positively. Italy also has a positive response on day -6, but a negative on the event day; 
Portugal and Ireland also react negatively on the event day. Germany seems to anticipate 
the announcement, with a 1% significant result on day -3 and no other significant AR later, 
although most are negative. Switzerland has a late response on day +3. Finally, the United 
Kingdom has significant returns on days -10 (positive) and -7 (negative) as well as +6 
(negative). 
Using a shorter time window, Italy and Portugal continue to react on the event day; 
Germany maintains its late response on day +4; Switzerland also continues to react 
negatively on days +2 and +3. France now reacts with a negative AR on the event day. The 




As illustrated by Panel 7.5.E, with the usage of the large time window we observe that 
Italy, Germany and the United States do not react to a Portuguese downgrade; France reacts 
negatively afterwards (on days +2 and +5).  The other countries have some significant 
returns far from the event window and positive (Spain on days -8 and +9, Switzerland on day 
+4, Greece on days -10 and -8). Ireland, curiously, has some strong (5% or 1% significant) 
positive ARs on days -9, -8, -6 and -1. Finally, the United Kingdom has a negative response 
on day -4 and a positive on day +8. 
With the usage of a shorter time window, illustrated on Panel 7.5.E, we see that 
Germany and the United States continue to show no reaction; Greece does not respond 
either. France shows negative response on days -4, +2 and +5; Italy on day +5; Spain on day 
+5. The United Kingdom continues to have a negative AR on day -4 and Ireland continues to 
show a positive AR before the event. 
Q3: Other banks’ reaction 
In this section we focus on bank downgrades to see if there are spillovers from one 
country to the other. In particular, we test for abnormal returns on banks based in the same 
country, but not downgraded, and then on banks based on other countries. 
National effects 
To capture this effect, we used the base methodology (larger event window and 
variances without day blocks) and considered all downgrade events. As shown in Panel 8.1, 
the ARs and CARs in non-event banks of the same country where a downgrade happens are 
hardly significant for the countries under analysis. The significant ARs are far from the event 
day, except in the case of Italy (day -2) and the United States (day +1). Looking at CARs, 
which may capture the event reaction better since they allow for a lagged response, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom continue without significant CARs; other countries 
have them, and results are in those cases positive: these countries’ banks seem to benefit 
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from rivals’ downgrades. We should note, however, that some countries (Portugal, 
Switzerland) were left with few observations and their results should not be too much upheld. 
International effects 
We started by computing base-window abnormal returns and test statistics as well as 
cumulative abnormal returns. In many cases, abnormal returns were significant a few days 
before or after the actual event and we suspect that it has to do with clustering of events. 
Therefore, we computed CARs which can give us a better idea of the downgrade impact 
around the time of the event. In the cases when more than one bank of a particular country 
was downgraded in one day, we only consider the event once for other countries. The results 
are shown on Panels 8.2.A to 8.2.J 
Two countries had non-significant impacts on the others: Spain and Portugal, with 15 
and 10 event dates (respectively). When British banks were downgraded, only German and 
French banks responded with significant CARs; in the German case, they were particularly 
high (-7.18% with 5% significance). In Ireland, where there is only one bank, seven 
downgrades happened: a single country, France, showed some evidence of response with 
significant positive CARs; although not significant, it is interesting to note how all other 
European countries responded with positive ARs. Italian banks’ downgrades were received 
with positive CARs for all countries, but only significant in Portugal and Germany.  
Downgrades from Greek banks caused significant CARs in Ireland, Portugal and France: in 
Ireland, they were initially negative but became positive on the event day; on other countries, 
they were negative. American banks’ downgrades (23) only impacted two countries, Portugal 
and Switzerland, and the response was positive in every country. Swiss banks’ downgrades 
were met with significant CARs positive in the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany; in 
Ireland, they caused negative CARs. Finally, in response to French bank downgrades, banks 
in all countries had on average positive CARs; the results are significant for Italian and Swiss 
banks, but even more to Portuguese and Irish banks. 
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In response to this question, we can therefore conclude that cross effects only happen 
between some countries; Ireland and Portugal seem to be more vulnerable to rating 
changes. Moreover, he impact is not linear: Portuguese banks react negatively to Greek 
downgrades, but positively to Swiss banks, for example. 
Discussion of results 
A large part of the conclusions to which we arrived goes against our initial hypotheses 
and the literature in the topic; we must then question the motives why this may have 
happened, and what are the implications of our results. 
Banks do not seem to be impacted by downgrades to their debt; Gropp and Richards 
(2001) had pointed at significant reactions to rating downgrades, which we do not encounter. 
However, an obvious difference between the two studies is the sample: Gropp and 
Richards’s is prior to the current financial crisis, and with the amount of credit rating changes 
that has happened lately, results may well have changed. We would even suspect there can 
be differences between initial and later rounds of rating cuts: while initial downgrades may 
have been faced as unexpected and event negative outlooks caused the market to stumble, 
as happened in previous years, we hypothesize that as credit ratings continue to be cut they 
lose information effect. This may be exacerbated by decreases below-investment grade, 
where from that point on, equity prices cease to decline as much as they did in higher levels. 
Gropp and Richards, following Goh and Ederington (1993), point at different stock price 
behaviour depending on the reason why the firm is downgraded. However, this does not 
seem to explain our loss of significance, as it is hardly the case that recent downgrades 
happened because of capital structure choices – they were motivated by deteriorating 
economic conditions. 
Moreover, with the turmoil in the markets in more recent years, rating downgrades to 
corporate debt may no longer be discrete, isolated events, that necessarily impacts firms (the 
issue of event window contamination). The way ratings are given may have also changed: 
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ratings can be assigned to match the perceived conditions of the firm, instead of shaping the 
market’s view; this, however, is a difficult hypothesis to explore or prove. 
In another departure from the existing literature, we saw that sovereign credit rating 
cuts did not seem to cause strong negative impacts on stock prices. Correa, Lee, Sapriza 
and Suarez (2012) used a recent sample, missing only the downgrades from 2012 (in 
comparison with our sample), though including many years before; that is probably not the 
source for differences. In this case, we suspect that the division by countries, as used in our 
paper, does not fully capture the dynamics of contagion. We grouped our observations by 
countries because we wanted to address anedoctal evidence of international contagion; 
while an answer regarding whether or not countries are linearly connected to one another 
would be interesting, other factors are probably more preponderant. As we discussed before, 
the authors propose some – such as reliance on sovereign help in case of difficulties. 
When it comes to cross effects, where the literature is scarcer, we find no clear impacts 
between countries. There are some significant responses, particularly in CARs and in many 
cases positive. One factor could explain why banks react positively to some banks’ rating 
cuts and negatively to others: the perceived implications that will have on the 
macroeconomic level. If a bank with higher systemic importance is under fire (a “too big to 
fail” bank), the regulator is more likely to act than if a smaller bank sees its conditions 
worsen. While we have no proof to offer on this hypothesis, similar action happened with 
sovereign debt – as soon as Spain and especially Italy started to raise concerns about their 
credit quality, the regulator took big steps to halt climbing yield spreads. 
At this point, we should also note that our methodology is different to the one used in 
most papers cited so far. Instead of a regression to explain returns, we used an innovative 
statistic that tries to account for event-induced volatility and cross correlation, diminishing 
type I error when computing t-statistics for the event days. While theoretically this approach 
is adequate to our study, it may be in fact damaging the results by failing to reject the null 
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hypothesis (that abnormal returns are zero) when it should; but for all we know, it may also 
be the case that previous studies did not model volatilities correctly and that our results 
actually represent an improvement over previous studies. 
Further research 
Given the results discussed so far, we are left with many questions and possibilites for 
research in the future. One useful exercise might be, continuing with this methodology, make 
subsamples on time, extending our analysis to the years before the crisis and check for 
significant differences; even with our current sample, there are enough events to allow for 
subsample analysis. It may also be interesting to analyse the difference between investment 
grade and speculative grade ratings, given the role of contigency-regulations. We could also 
estimate returns using a different model (or a different benchmark) to see if these are altered. 
The reason why we have not done this analysis yet is the fact that the constrast of our 
results to previous ones may reveal inadequacy in the methodology used; therefore, a 
preliminary exercise could be a replication of the most commonly used methodologies for our 
sample, most recent, and see if results uphold. If they do approach our results – with loss of 
significance in abnormal returns, particularly for downgrades –, that would be a signal that 
this methodology is adequate; if they do not, then we should explore the underlying 
assumptions in our methodology and see if it applies practically to these events (albeit their 
theoretical sense). 
Managerial implications 
Whatever the reason why our exercise shows different results than other studies, one 
thing is clear: ratings and their impact should not be taken at face value. While their role is 
undoubtedly important, they have also been shown to cyclically lose quality, to be tangled in 
conflicts of interests and they may not show new information. Managing a firm’s financial 
decisions only with ratings in mind does not seem to be a good policy; investors should also 




This paper focusses on the impact that credit rating changes – in corporate and 
sovereign debt – have on equity prices of banks; we focus mainly on downgrades and in a 
varied sample of advanced economies (some in better financial shape than others). Bank 
upgrades seem to be anticipated by the market, with significant results before the 
announcement. Most importantly, we do not find significant abnormal returns at the time of 
downgrades neither for corporates nor for sovereigns, which somehow contradicts the 
existing literature. The paper therefore questions the much-vaunted implication of 
downgrades, which so far have been described as meaningful events but may see their 
importance change as the number increases and they cease to bring new information to the 
market. Additionally, we found only mild evidence of contagion between banks and between 
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Appendix 1 – Evolution of stock markets, bank nonperforming loans to total 
gross loans and gross national income for a selection of countries, 2007-2012 and of 
States’ financial costs in the European Union 
 
Data source: Euromonitor from trade sources/national statistics. Retrieved from Euromonitor on 
27-03-2013. 
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Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Gross Loans (%) 




Adaptation of the Euromonitor Gross National Income (GNI) series, original data in millions of local 
currency (USD for the United States, CHF for Switzerland, GBP for the United Kingdom, EUR for the 
rest). Data source: Euromonitor International from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics. Retrieved from Euromonitor on 27-03-2013. 
 
Evolution of Long-term interest rates for European Union Member States, 2009-2013 
 
Retrieved from Wikipedia on 16-04-2013. Data source: (European Central Bank, 2013) 
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Appendix 2 – Banks included in the study 
Following regulators’ reports on the financial system strength (“stress tests”), we identified a total of 83 
banks; of these, 50 were listed and had available financial information, but 2 were left out since the 








American Express Company AXP US 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. GS US 
Bank of America Corporation BAC US 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPM US 
BB&T Corporation BBT US 
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation BK US 
Capital One Financial Corporation COF US 
Citigroup Inc. C US 
Fifth Third Bancorp FITB US 
KeyCorp KEY US 
Morgan Stanley MS US 
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. PNC US 
Regions Financial Corporation RF US 
State Street Corporation STT US 
SunTrust Banks, Inc. STI US 
U.S. Bancorp USB US 
Wells Fargo & Co. WFC US 
France 
 
BNP Paribas  BNP FP 
Credit Agricole ACA FP 
Societe Generale GLE FP 
Germany 
 
Deutsche Bank AG DBK GY 
Commerzbank AG CBK GY 
Greece 
 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A. EUROB GA 
National Bank Of Greece  ETE GA 
Alpha Bank  ALPHA GA 
Piraeus Bank Group TPEIR GA 
Agricultural Bank Of Greece S.A. (ATEbank)  ATE GA 
TT Hellenic Postbank S.A. TT GA 
Ireland 
 
Bank of ireland BKIR ID 
Italy 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A ISP IM 
Unicredit S.p.A UCG IM 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena S.p.A BMPS IM 
Banco Popolare - S.C. BP IM 





Banco Comercial Português, SA (BCP Or Millennium BCP) BCP PL 
Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA (ESFG) BES PL 




Banco Santander S.A. SAN SM 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (Bbva) BBVA SM 
Banco Popular Español, S.A. POP SM 
Banco de Sabadell, S.A. SAB SM 
Bankinter, S.A. BKT SM 
Switzerland 
 
UBS UBSN VX 
Credit Suisse CSGN VX 
United Kingdom 
 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP plc RBS LN 
HSBC HOLDINGS plc HSBA LN 
BARCLAYS plc BARC LN 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP plc LLOY LN 
 
Excluded 
Time series started after 01.01.2008 
Caja De Ahorros Del Mediterráneo (CAM SM), BFA-BANKIA (BKIA SM) 
Not listed or with trading suspended 
Ally Financial Inc. (United States), BPCE (France), Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, 
DZ Bank AG Dt. Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Norddeutsche Landesbank –
GZ–, Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, München, WestLB AG - Düsseldorf, HSH Nordbank AG – 
Hamburg, Landesbank Berlin AG, Dekabank Deutsche Girozentrale – Frankfurt, WGZ Bank AG 
Westdt. Geno. Zentralbk, Ddf (Germany), Allied Irish Banks plc, Irish Life and Permanent (Ireland), 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA (Portugal) and Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, Caja 
De Ahorros y Monte de Piedad, Grupo Banca Civica, Caja de Ahorros y M.P. De Zaragoza, Aragon y 
Rioja, Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Ronda, Cadiz, Almeria, Malaga, Antequera y Jaen, 
Banco Pastor, S.A., Grupo BBK, Caixa D'estalvis Unio de Caixes de Manlleu, Sabadell I Terrassa, 
Caja de Ahorros y M.P. De Gipuzkoa Y San Sebastian, Grupo Caja3, Banca March, S.A., Caja de 
Ahorros de Vitoria y Alava, Caja de Ahorros Y M.P. de Ontinyent, Colonya - Caixa D'estalvis de 
Pollensa, Caixa D'estalvis De Catalunya, Tarragona I Manresa, Caixa de Aforros de Galicia, Vigo, 
Ourense e Pontevedra, Grupo BMN, Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona, Effibank (Spain)  
 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2013) 
(European Banking Authority, 2011) 




Appendix 3 – Bank rating changes description 
List of the 222 rating changes made by S&P to the banks in the sample included in the event 
study. Upgrades are indicated in italics; *+ denotes a positive watch, *- denotes a negative watch. 
Event Bank Date Previous New 
 
Event Bank Date Previous New 
BnkRtg0 BMPS IM 05-12-12 BBB- BB+ *-  BnkRtg39 ACA FP 23-01-12 A+ *- A  
BnkRtg1 SAB SM 23-11-12 BB *- BB  
 
BnkRtg40 GLE FP 23-01-12 A+ *- A  
BnkRtg2 POP SM 23-11-12 BB *- BB  
 
BnkRtg41 BKIR ID 20-01-12 BB+ *- BB+  
BnkRtg3 BKT SM 23-11-12 BB+ *- BB  
 
BnkRtg42 BPI PL 16-12-11 BBB- *- BB+ *- 
BnkRtg4 BNP FP 25-10-12 AA-  A+  
 
BnkRtg43 BCP PL 16-12-11 BBB- *- BB *- 
BnkRtg5 BBVA SM 16-10-12 BBB+  BBB-  
 
BnkRtg44 BES PL 16-12-11 BBB- *- BB  
BnkRtg6 SAB SM 16-10-12 BB+  BB *- 
 
BnkRtg45 SAB SM 15-12-11 A- *- BBB *- 
BnkRtg7 POP SM 16-10-12 BB+ *- BB *- 
 
BnkRtg46 POP SM 15-12-11 A- *- BBB+ *- 
BnkRtg8 SAN SM 16-10-12 A-  BBB  
 
BnkRtg47 BKT SM 15-12-11 A- *- BBB+ *- 
BnkRtg9 BKT SM 16-10-12 BB+  BB+ *- 
 
BnkRtg48 BBVA SM 08-12-11 A+  A+ *- 
BnkRtg10 USB US 20-08-12 A  A+  
 
BnkRtg49 SAB SM 08-12-11 A-  A- *- 
BnkRtg11 POP SM 08-08-12 BB+  BB+ *- 
 
BnkRtg50 SAN SM 08-12-11 AA-  AA- *- 
BnkRtg12 BMPS IM 03-08-12 BBB *- BBB-  
 
BnkRtg51 BKIR ID 08-12-11 BB+  BB+ *- 
BnkRtg13 UBI IM 03-08-12 BBB+  BBB  
 
BnkRtg52 BKT SM 08-12-11 A-  A- *- 
BnkRtg14 BMPS IM 18-06-12 BBB  BBB *- 
 
BnkRtg53 BMPS IM 07-12-11 BBB+  BBB+ *- 
BnkRtg15 SAB SM 25-05-12 BB+ *- BB+  
 
BnkRtg54 BPI PL 07-12-11 BBB-  BBB- *- 
BnkRtg16 POP SM 25-05-12 BBB- *- BB+  
 
BnkRtg55 BCP PL 07-12-11 BBB-  BBB- *- 
BnkRtg17 BKT SM 25-05-12 BBB- *- BB+  
 
BnkRtg56 BES PL 07-12-11 BBB-  BBB- *- 
BnkRtg18 BBVA SM 30-04-12 A  BBB+  
 
BnkRtg57 BP IM 07-12-11 BBB  BBB *- 
BnkRtg19 SAB SM 30-04-12 BBB- *- BB+ *- 
 
BnkRtg58 BNP FP 07-12-11 AA-  AA- *- 
BnkRtg20 SAN SM 30-04-12 A+  A-  
 
BnkRtg59 CBK GR 07-12-11 A  A *- 
BnkRtg21 BKT SM 30-04-12 BBB  BBB- *- 
 
BnkRtg60 ACA FP 07-12-11 A+  A+ *- 
BnkRtg22 RF US 15-03-12 BB+  BBB-  
 
BnkRtg61 ISP IM 07-12-11 A  A *- 
BnkRtg23 BPI PL 14-02-12 BB+ *- BB-  
 
BnkRtg62 GLE FP 07-12-11 A+  A+ *- 
BnkRtg24 BCP PL 14-02-12 BB *- B+  
 
BnkRtg63 UCG IM 07-12-11 A  A *- 
BnkRtg25 BES PL 14-02-12 BB *- BB-  
 
BnkRtg64 UBI IM 07-12-11 A-  A- *- 
BnkRtg26 BBVA SM 13-02-12 A+ *- A  
 
BnkRtg65 BBT US 06-12-11 A  A-  
BnkRtg27 SAB SM 13-02-12 BBB *- BBB- *- 
 
BnkRtg66 PNC US 06-12-11 A  A-  
BnkRtg28 POP SM 13-02-12 BBB+ *- BBB- *- 
 
BnkRtg67 USB US 06-12-11 A+  A  
BnkRtg29 SAN SM 13-02-12 AA- *- A+  
 
BnkRtg68 BBVA SM 29-11-11 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg30 BKT SM 13-02-12 BBB+ *- BBB  
 
BnkRtg69 BAC US 29-11-11 A  A-  
BnkRtg31 BMPS IM 10-02-12 BBB+ *- BBB  
 
BnkRtg70 BK US 29-11-11 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg32 BP IM 10-02-12 BBB *- BBB-  
 
BnkRtg71 BARC LN 29-11-11 A+  A  
BnkRtg33 ISP IM 10-02-12 A *- BBB+  
 
BnkRtg72 C US 29-11-11 A  A-  
BnkRtg34 UCG IM 10-02-12 A *- BBB+  
 
BnkRtg73 GS US 29-11-11 A  A-  
BnkRtg35 UBI IM 10-02-12 A- *- BBB+  
 
BnkRtg74 HSBA LN 29-11-11 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg36 BES PL 31-01-12 BB  BB *- 
 
BnkRtg75 JPM US 29-11-11 A+  A  
BnkRtg37 CBK GR 25-01-12 A *- A  
 
BnkRtg76 LLOY LN 29-11-11 A  A-  
BnkRtg38 BNP FP 23-01-12 AA- *- AA-  
 
BnkRtg77 MS US 29-11-11 A  A-  
50 
 
Event Bank Date Previous New 
 
Event Bank Date Previous New 
BnkRtg78 RBS LN 29-11-11 A  A-  
 
BnkRtg122 RF US 23-11-10 BBB-  BB+  
BnkRtg79 UBSN VX 29-11-11 A+ *- A   BnkRtg123 TPEIR GA 01-10-10 BB *- BB  
BnkRtg80 WFC US 29-11-11 AA-  A+  
 
BnkRtg124 SAB SM 26-07-10 A *- A  
BnkRtg81 BMPS IM 18-10-11 A-  BBB+  
 
BnkRtg125 TPEIR GA 16-07-10 BB  BB *- 
BnkRtg82 BP IM 18-10-11 A-  BBB  
 
BnkRtg126 SAB SM 11-06-10 A  A *- 
BnkRtg83 UBI IM 18-10-11 A  A-  
 
BnkRtg127 ALPHA GA 27-04-10 BBB  BB  
BnkRtg84 BNP FP 14-10-11 AA  AA-  
 
BnkRtg128 BPI PL 27-04-10 A  A-  
BnkRtg85 BBVA SM 11-10-11 AA  AA-  
 
BnkRtg129 BCP PL 27-04-10 A-  BBB+  
BnkRtg86 SAB SM 11-10-11 A  A-  
 
BnkRtg130 BES PL 27-04-10 A  A-  
BnkRtg87 POP SM 11-10-11 A-  A- *- 
 
BnkRtg131 EUROB GA 27-04-10 BBB  BB  
BnkRtg88 SAN SM 11-10-11 AA  AA-  
 
BnkRtg132 ETE GA 27-04-10 BBB+  BB+  
BnkRtg89 BKT SM 11-10-11 A  A-  
 
BnkRtg133 TPEIR GA 27-04-10 BBB  BB  
BnkRtg90 ISP IM 21-09-11 A+  A  
 
BnkRtg134 ISP IM 23-04-10 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg91 UBSN VX 16-09-11 A+  A+ *- 
 
BnkRtg135 ALPHA GA 16-03-10 BBB *- BBB  
BnkRtg92 BKIR ID 11-07-11 BB+ *- BB+  
 
BnkRtg136 EUROB GA 16-03-10 BBB *- BBB  
BnkRtg93 ALPHA GA 15-06-11 B *- CCC  
 
BnkRtg137 ETE GA 16-03-10 BBB+ *- BBB+  
BnkRtg94 EUROB GA 15-06-11 B *- CCC  
 
BnkRtg138 TPEIR GA 16-03-10 BBB *- BBB  
BnkRtg95 ETE GA 15-06-11 B *- CCC  
 
BnkRtg139 RF US 11-03-10 BBB  BBB-  
BnkRtg96 TPEIR GA 15-06-11 B *- CCC  
 
BnkRtg140 BP IM 10-03-10 A- *- A-  
BnkRtg97 BCP PL 14-06-11 BBB- *- BBB-  
 
BnkRtg141 STI US 01-02-10 BBB+  BBB  
BnkRtg98 ACA FP 20-05-11 AA-  A+  
 
BnkRtg142 BKIR ID 26-01-10 A *- A-  
BnkRtg99 ALPHA GA 11-05-11 B+ *- B *- 
 
BnkRtg143 ALPHA GA 17-12-09 BBB+  BBB *- 
BnkRtg100 EUROB GA 11-05-11 B+ *- B *- 
 
BnkRtg144 BP IM 17-12-09 A-  A- *- 
BnkRtg101 ETE GA 11-05-11 B+ *- B *- 
 
BnkRtg145 EUROB GA 17-12-09 BBB+  BBB *- 
BnkRtg102 TPEIR GA 11-05-11 B+ *- B *- 
 
BnkRtg146 ETE GA 17-12-09 BBB+  BBB+ *- 
BnkRtg103 ALPHA GA 31-03-11 BB *- B+ *- 
 
BnkRtg147 TPEIR GA 17-12-09 BBB  BBB *- 
BnkRtg104 BPI PL 31-03-11 BBB *- BBB-  
 
BnkRtg148 RF US 04-11-09 BBB+  BBB  
BnkRtg105 BES PL 31-03-11 BBB *- BBB-  
 
BnkRtg149 BMPS IM 01-10-09 A  A-  
BnkRtg106 EUROB GA 31-03-11 BB *- B+ *- 
 
BnkRtg150 BCP PL 30-07-09 A  A-  
BnkRtg107 ETE GA 31-03-11 BB+ *- B+ *- 
 
BnkRtg151 POP SM 10-07-09 A+  A  
BnkRtg108 TPEIR GA 31-03-11 BB *- B+ *- 
 
BnkRtg152 BBT US 17-06-09 A+ *- A  
BnkRtg109 BPI PL 28-03-11 A- *- BBB *- 
 
BnkRtg153 COF US 17-06-09 BBB+ *- BBB  
BnkRtg110 BCP PL 28-03-11 BBB+ *- BBB- *- 
 
BnkRtg154 FITB US 17-06-09 A- *- BBB  
BnkRtg111 BES PL 28-03-11 A- *- BBB *- 
 
BnkRtg155 KEY US 17-06-09 A- *- BBB+  
BnkRtg112 POP SM 22-02-11 A  A-  
 
BnkRtg156 PNC US 17-06-09 A *- A  
BnkRtg113 BKIR ID 02-02-11 BBB+ *- BB+ *- 
 
BnkRtg157 RF US 17-06-09 A *- BBB+  
BnkRtg114 ALPHA GA 03-12-10 BB  BB *- 
 
BnkRtg158 USB US 17-06-09 AA *- A+  
BnkRtg115 BPI PL 03-12-10 A-  A- *- 
 
BnkRtg159 WFC US 17-06-09 AA *- AA-  
BnkRtg116 BCP PL 03-12-10 BBB+  BBB+ *- 
 
BnkRtg160 BAC US 08-05-09 A *- A  
BnkRtg117 BES PL 03-12-10 A-  A- *- 
 
BnkRtg161 C US 08-05-09 A *- A  
BnkRtg118 EUROB GA 03-12-10 BB  BB *- 
 
BnkRtg162 GLE FP 07-05-09 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg119 ETE GA 03-12-10 BB+  BB+ *- 
 
BnkRtg163 BAC US 04-05-09 A  A *- 
BnkRtg120 TPEIR GA 03-12-10 BB  BB *- 
 
BnkRtg164 BBT US 04-05-09 A+  A+ *- 
BnkRtg121 BKIR ID 26-11-10 A-  BBB+ *- 
 




Event Bank Date Previous New 
 
Event Bank Date Previous New 
BnkRtg166 C US 04-05-09 A  A *- 
 
BnkRtg210 UBSN VX 17-10-08 AA-  AA- *- 
BnkRtg167 EUROB GA 04-05-09 A-  BBB+   BnkRtg211 RBS LN 06-10-08 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg168 FITB US 04-05-09 A-  A- *- 
 
BnkRtg212 WFC US 03-10-08 AA+  AA+ *- 
BnkRtg169 KEY US 04-05-09 A-  A- *- 
 
BnkRtg213 POP SM 02-10-08 AA  AA-  
BnkRtg170 TPEIR GA 04-05-09 BBB+  BBB  
 
BnkRtg214 C US 29-09-08 AA-  AA- *- 
BnkRtg171 PNC US 04-05-09 A  A *- 
 
BnkRtg215 LLOY LN 18-09-08 AA-  AA- *- 
BnkRtg172 RF US 04-05-09 A  A *- 
 
BnkRtg216 BARC LN 17-09-08 AA-  AA- *- 
BnkRtg173 USB US 04-05-09 AA  AA *- 
 
BnkRtg217 BAC US 15-09-08 AA  AA- *- 
BnkRtg174 WFC US 04-05-09 AA  AA *- 
 
BnkRtg218 FITB US 03-09-08 A+  A+ *- 
BnkRtg175 BKIR ID 01-05-09 A  A *- 
 
BnkRtg219 BK US 27-06-08 A+  AA-  
BnkRtg176 AXP US 30-04-09 A *- BBB+  
 
BnkRtg220 C US 02-06-08 AA- *- AA-  
BnkRtg177 STI US 28-04-09 A  BBB+  
 
BnkRtg221 MS US 02-06-08 AA-  A+  
BnkRtg178 BP IM 26-03-09 A *- A-  
 
     
BnkRtg179 AXP US 19-03-09 A  A *- 
      
BnkRtg180 UCG IM 18-03-09 A+  A  
      
BnkRtg181 LLOY LN 06-03-09 A+  A  
      
BnkRtg182 SAB SM 04-03-09 A+  A  
 
Source: Bloomberg; retrieved on April 7, 2013. 
BnkRtg183 POP SM 04-03-09 AA-  A+  
      
BnkRtg184 BAC US 03-03-09 A+  A  
      
BnkRtg185 BP IM 20-02-09 A  A *- 
      
BnkRtg186 BKIR ID 12-02-09 A+ *- A  
      
BnkRtg187 BNP FP 28-01-09 AA+ *- AA  
      
BnkRtg188 STI US 27-01-09 A+  A  
      
BnkRtg189 STT US 20-01-09 AA-  A+  
      
BnkRtg190 LLOY LN 14-01-09 AA- *- A+  
      
BnkRtg191 PNC US 07-01-09 A+ *- A  
      
BnkRtg192 ALPHA GA 19-12-08 A-  BBB+  
      
BnkRtg193 AXP US 19-12-08 A+ *- A  
      
BnkRtg194 BAC US 19-12-08 AA- *- A+  
      
BnkRtg195 BARC LN 19-12-08 AA- *- A+  
      
BnkRtg196 C US 19-12-08 AA- *- A  
      
BnkRtg197 CSGN VX 19-12-08 A+ *- A  
      
BnkRtg198 FITB US 19-12-08 A+ *- A-  
      
BnkRtg199 GS US 19-12-08 AA-  A  
      
BnkRtg200 JPM US 19-12-08 AA-  A+  
      
BnkRtg201 MS US 19-12-08 A+  A  
      
BnkRtg202 RBS LN 19-12-08 A+  A  
      
BnkRtg203 UBSN VX 19-12-08 AA- *- A+  
      
BnkRtg204 WFC US 19-12-08 AA+ *- AA  
      
BnkRtg205 BNP FP 17-12-08 AA+  AA+ *- 
      
BnkRtg206 CSGN VX 04-12-08 A+  A+ *- 
      
BnkRtg207 BKIR ID 14-11-08 A+  A+ *- 
      
BnkRtg208 PNC US 24-10-08 A+  A+ *- 
      
BnkRtg209 AXP US 21-10-08 A+  A+ *- 
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Summary of Bank Rating changes 
  Downgrades Upgrades Total 
2008 28 2 30 
2009 46 3 49 
2010 22 7 29 
2011 70 2 72 













2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Distribution of bank downgrades each year, by country (2008-2010) 
United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Greece











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Distribution of bank upgrades each year, by country (2008-2010) 
United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Greece
Portugal United States Switzerland Germany France
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Appendix 4 – Sovereign rating changes description 
List of the 54 rating changes by S&P to the countries in the sample (Long term Foreign 
Currency Debt) included in the event study. Upgrades are indicated in italics, no changes underlined 
(rating reaffirmation); *+ denotes a positive watch, *- denotes a negative watch, u denotes an 
unsolicited rating. 
Event Country Date Previous New 
 
Event Country Date Previous New 
CtryRtg1 Greece 18-12-12 SD B- 
 
CtryRtg42 Greece 27-04-10 BBB+ BB+ 
CtryRtg2 Greece 05-12-12 CCC SD 
 
CtryRtg43 Portugal 27-04-10 A+ A- 
CtryRtg3 Spain 10-10-12 BBB+ BBB- 
 
CtryRtg44 Greece 16-03-10 BBB+ *- BBB+ 
CtryRtg4 Greece 02-05-12 SD CCC 
 
CtryRtg45 Greece 16-12-09 A- *- BBB+ *- 
CtryRtg5 Spain 26-04-12 A BBB+ 
 
CtryRtg46 Greece 07-12-09 A- A- *- 
CtryRtg6 Greece 27-02-12 CC SD 
 
CtryRtg47 Ireland 08-06-09 AA+ AA 
CtryRtg7 Spain 13-01-12 AA- *- A 
 
CtryRtg48 Ireland 30-03-09 AAA AA+ 
CtryRtg8 Ireland 13-01-12 BBB+ *- BBB+ 
 
CtryRtg49 Portugal 21-01-09 AA- *- A+ 
CtryRtg9 Italy 13-01-12 Au *- BBB+u 
 
CtryRtg50 Spain 19-01-09 AAA *- AA+ 
CtryRtg10 Portugal 13-01-12 BBB- *- BB 
 
CtryRtg51 Greece 14-01-09 A *- A- 
CtryRtg11 Germany 13-01-12 AAAu *- AAAu 
 
CtryRtg52 Portugal 13-01-09 AA- AA- *- 
CtryRtg12 France 13-01-12 AAAu *- AA+u 
 
CtryRtg53 Spain 12-01-09 AAA AAA *- 
CtryRtg13 Spain 05-12-11 AA- AA- *- 
 
CtryRtg54 Greece 09-01-09 A A *- 
CtryRtg14 Ireland 05-12-11 BBB+ BBB+ *- 
      CtryRtg15 Italy 05-12-11 Au Au *- 
      CtryRtg16 Portugal 05-12-11 BBB- BBB- *- 
 
Source: Bloomberg; retrieved on April 7, 2013. 
CtryRtg17 Germany 05-12-11 AAAu AAAu *- 
      CtryRtg18 France 05-12-11 AAAu AAAu *- 
      CtryRtg19 Spain 13-10-11 AA AA- 
      CtryRtg20 Italy 19-09-11 A+u Au 
      CtryRtg21 US 05-08-11 AAAu *- AA+u 
      CtryRtg22 Greece 27-07-11 CCC CC 
      CtryRtg23 US 14-07-11 AAAu AAAu *- 
      CtryRtg24 Greece 13-06-11 B *- CCC 
      CtryRtg25 Greece 09-05-11 BB- *- B *- 
      CtryRtg26 Ireland 01-04-11 A- *- BBB+ 
      CtryRtg27 Greece 29-03-11 BB+ *- BB- *- 
      CtryRtg28 Portugal 29-03-11 BBB *- BBB- 
      CtryRtg29 Portugal 24-03-11 A- *- BBB *- 
      CtryRtg30 US 24-02-11 AAA AAAu 
      CtryRtg31 UK 17-02-11 AAA AAAu 
      CtryRtg32 Italy 17-02-11 A+ A+u 
      CtryRtg33 Switzerland 17-02-11 AAA AAAu 
      CtryRtg34 Germany 17-02-11 AAA AAAu 
      CtryRtg35 France 17-02-11 AAA AAAu 
      CtryRtg36 Ireland 02-02-11 A *- A- *- 
      CtryRtg37 Greece 02-12-10 BB+ BB+ *- 
      CtryRtg38 Ireland 23-11-10 AA- A *- 
      CtryRtg39 Portugal 20-11-10 A- A- *- 
      CtryRtg40 Ireland 24-08-10 AA AA- 
      CtryRtg41 Spain 28-04-10 AA+ AA 
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Summary of Sovereign Rating changes 
 
Downgrades Upgrades Neutral All 
2008 0 0 0 0 
2009 10 1 0 11 
2010 7 0 0 7 
2011 18 0 6 24 













2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Distribution of sovereign downgrades each year, by country 
(2008-2010) 











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Distribution of sovereign upgrades each year, by country 
(2008-2010) 
UK Spain Ireland Italy Greece Portugal US Switzerland Germany France Total
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Appendix 5 – List of event clusters 
Cluster Situation 
1 BnkRtg0 and CtryRtg2 happen on the same day, 05-12-2012. 
2 
On 23-11-2012, three Spanish banks have their rating changed: two are upgraded 
(BnkRtg1 and BnkRtg2), the other is downgraded (BnkRtg3). 
3 
Five Spanish banks are downgraded on the same day, 16-10-2012 (BnkRtg5 to BnkRtg9). 
They are preceded by a Spanish sovereign rating downgrade on 10-10-2012 (CtryRtg3) 
4 
Two Italian banks are downgraded on the same day, 03-08-2012 (BnkRtg12 and 
BnkRtg13). 
On 08-08-2012, a Spanish Bank is downgraded (BnkRtg11). 
5 
Two Spanish banks are downgraded (BnkRtg16 and BnkRtg17) and one is upgraded 
(BnkRtg15) on 25-05-2012. 
6 
A Spanish sovereign rating downgrade on 26-04-2012 (CtryRtg5) is followed by four 
Spanish bank downgrades on 30-04-2012 (BnkRtg18 to BnkRtg21). 
Greece is upgraded on 02-05-2012. 
7 
On 10-02-2012, all Italian banks are downgraded (BnkRtg31 to BnkRtg35). 
On 13-02-2012, all Spanish banks are downgraded (BnkRtg26 to BnkRtg30). 
On 14-02-2012, all Portuguese banks are downgraded (BnkRtg23 to BnkRtg25). 
8 
On 20-01-2012, the Irish Bank is upgraded (BnkRtg41). 
On 23-01-2012, two French banks are downgraded (BnkRtg39 and BnkRtg40), the other is 
upgraded (BnkRtg39). 
On 25-01-2012, a German Bank is upgraded (BnkRtg37). 
Close to Cluster 9 
9 
Six countries are downgraded on 13-01-2012: Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Germany and 
France (CtryRtg7 to CtryRtg12). 
10 
Three Spanish banks (BnkRtg45 to BnkRtg47) are downgraded on 15-12-2011. All 
Portuguese banks (BnkRtg42 to BnkRtg44) are downgraded on 16-12-2011.  
Close to Cluster 11 
11 
On 05-12-2011, six countries are downgraded: Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Germany and 
France (CtryRtg13 to CtryRtg18), similarly to cluster 9. 
On 06-12-2011, three American banks (BnkRtg65 to BnkRtg67) are downgraded. 
On 07-12-2011, there are 12 bank downgrades: all the Italian (BnkRtg53, BnkRtg57, 
BnkRtg61, BnkRtg63 and BnkRtg64); all the Portuguese (BnkRtg54 to BnkRtg56); all the 
French (BnkRtg58, BnkRtg60 and BnkRtg62); a German (BnkRtg59). 
On 08-12-2011, all Spanish banks are downgraded (BnkRtg48 to 52). 
12 
On 29-11-2011, 13 banks are downgraded: a Spanish (BnkRtg68); seven American 
(BnkRtg69, BnkRtg70, BnkRtg72, BnkRtg73, BnkRtg75, BnkRtg77 and BnkRtg80); all 
English (BnkRtg71, BnkRtg74, BnkRtg76 and BnkRtg78); a Swiss (BnkRtg79).  
13 
On 11-10-2011, all Spanish banks are downgraded (BnkRtg85 to BnkRtg89). 
On 13-10-2011, Spain is downgraded (CtryRtg19) – the exception where banks are 
downgraded immediately before the country and not the other way around. 
On 14-10-2011, a French bank is downgraded (BnkRtg84). 
On 18-10-2011, three Italian banks are downgraded (BnkRtg81 to BnkRtg83). 
14 
On 16-09-2011, a Swiss bank is downgraded (BnkRtg91). 
On 19-09-2011, Italy is downgraded (CtryRtg20). 
15 
On 11-07-2011, the Irish bank is upgraded (BnkRtg92). 
On 14-07-2011, the United States are downgraded (CtryRtg23). 
16 
On 13-06-2011, Greece is downgraded (CtryRtg24). 
On 14-06-2011, a Portuguese bank (BnkRtg97) and four Greek banks (BnkRtg93 to 
BnkRtg96) are downgraded, similarly to what happens in cluster 23. 
17 On 09-05-2011, Greece is downgraded (CtryRtg25). 
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On 11-05-2011, four Greek banks are downgraded (BnkRtg99 to BnkRtg102) - similarly to 
what happens in cluster 23. 
18 
On 24-03-2011, Portugal is downgraded (CtryRtg29). 
On 28-03-2011, all Portuguese banks are downgraded (BnkRtg109 to BnkRtg111). 
On 29-03-2011, Portugal and Greece are downgraded (CtryRtg27 and CtryRtg28). 
On 31-03-2011, four Greek banks (BnkRtg103, BnkRtg106 to BnkRtg108) and two 
Portuguese banks (BnkRtg104, BnkRtg106): similarly to what had happens in cluster 23. 
19 
On 17-02-2011, the ratings of France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and the United Kingdom 
are reaffirmed (CtryRtg31 to CtryRtg35). 
On 22-02-2011, a Spanish bank is downgraded (BnkRtg112). 
On 24-02-2011, the American rating is reaffirmed (CtryRtg30). 
20 
On 02-02-2011, both Ireland and the Irish bank are downgraded (CtryRtg36 and 
BnkRtg113). 
21 
On 02-12-2010, Greece is downgraded (CtryRtg37). 
The next day, four Greek banks (BnkRtg114 and BnkRtg118 to BnkRtg120) and all 
Portuguese banks (BnkRtg115 to BnkRtg118) are downgraded, similarly to what happens 
in cluster 23. 
22 
On 20-11-2010, Portugal is downgraded (CtryRtg39). 
On 23-11-2010, Ireland (CtryRtg38) and an American bank (BnkRtg122) are downgraded. 
On 26-11-2010, the Irish bank is downgraded (BnkRtg121). 
23 
On 23-03-2010, an Italian bank is downgraded (BnkRtg134). 
On 27-04-2010, Greece and Portugal (CtryRtg42 and CtryRtg43), as well as four Greek 
banks (BnkRtg127 and BnkRtg131 to BnkRtg133) and all Portuguese banks (BnkRtg128 to 
BnkRtg130) are downgraded. 
On 28-04-2010, Spain is downgraded (28-04-2010). 
24 
On 10-03-2010, an Italian bank is upgraded (BnkRtg140). 
On 11-03-2010, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg139). 
On 16-03-2010, Greece (CtryRtg44) and four Greek banks (BnkRtg135 to BnkRtg138) are 
downgraded. 
25 
On 16-12-2009, Greece is downgraded. 
The next day, four Greek banks (BnkRtg143 and BnkRtg145 to BnkRtg147) as well as an 
Italian bank (BnkRtg144) are downgraded. 
26 
On 17-06-2009, eight American banks have their ratings changed: one receives an 
upgrade (BnkRtg156) and the other are downgraded (BnkRtg152 to BnkRtg155 and 
BnkRtg157 to BnkRtg159). 
27 On 08-05-2009, two American banks are upgraded (BnkRtg160 and BnkRtg161). 
28 
On 04-05-2009, fifteen banks are downgraded: twelve American (BnkRtg163 to 
BnkRtg166, BnkRtg168 to BnkRtg169, BnkRtg171 to BnkRtg174 and BnkRtg176 to 
BnkRtg177); two Greek (BnkRtg167 and BnkRtg170); one French (BnkRtg 162); the Irish 
(BnkRtg175). 
29 
On 18-03-2009, an Italian bank is downgraded (BnkRtg180). 
The next day, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg179). 
On 26-03-2009, another Italian bank is downgraded (BnkRtg178). 
On 30-03-2009, Ireland is downgraded (CtryRtg48). 
30 
On 03-03-2009, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg184). 
The next day, two Spanish banks are downgraded (BnkRtg182 and BnkRtg183). 
On 06-03-2009, a British bank is downgraded (BnkRtg181). 
31 
On 07-01-2009, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg191). 
On 09-01-2009, Greece is downgraded (CtryRtg54). 
On 12-01-2009, Spain is downgraded (CtryRtg53). 
The next day, Portugal is downgraded (CtryRtg52). 
On 14-01-2009, Greece (CtryRtg51) and a British bank (BnkRtg190) are downgraded. 
57 
 
On 19-01-2009, Spain is downgraded. 
On 20-01-2009, another American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg189). 
On 21-01-2009, Portugal is downgraded (CtryRtg49). 
Six days later, yet another American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg188). 
Finally, on 28-01-2009, a French bank is downgraded (BnkRtg187). 
32 
On 18-12-2008, a French bank is downgraded (BnkRtg205). 
The next day, thirteen other banks are downgraded: eight American (BnkRtg193 to 
BnkRtg194, BnkRtg196, BnkRtg198 to BnkRtg201 and BnkRtg204); two British 
(BnkRtg195 and BnkRtg202); all the Swiss (BnkRtg197 and BnkRtg203); a Greek 
(BnkRtg192). 
33 
On 17-10-2008, a Swiss bank is downgraded (BnkRtg2010). 
On 21-10-2008, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg209). 
Three days later, another American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg208). 
Close to clusters 34 and 35. 
34 
On 29-09-2008, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg214). 
On 02-10-2008, a Spanish bank is downgraded (BnkRtg213). 
The next day, another American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg212). 
On 06-10-2008, a British bank is downgraded (BnkRtg211). 
Close to cluster 35. 
35 
On 15-09-2008, an American bank is downgraded (BnkRtg217). 
On 17-09-2008, a British bank is downgraded (BnkRtg216). 
The next day, another British bank is downgraded (BnkRtg215). 
36 
On 02-06-2008, two American banks have their ratings changed: one receives an upgrade 





Appendix 6 – Results for Q1 (Own banks’ effect) 




Confidence level Test statistic Value 
1%    
      2.63 
5%    
      1.98 
10%    
     1.66 
 




General results: Panel 
Panel 6.1 
Downgrades 
Using all the events, one 
average correlation 
Panel 6.2 
Using only rating cuts, 
correlation computed in 3 
ways 
Panel 6.3 







Panel Appendix 6.1 – General results for banks’ own effect 
Methodology used: simple variance and test statistics, without grouping by days or countries. Number 
of observations: 200 downgrades (results on the left); 22 upgrades (results on the right). 




Day AR tAB 
 
Day AR tAB 
-10 -0.94% -1.11 
 
-10 1.24% 0.91 
-9 1.39% **2.49 
 
-9 0.73% 0.35 
-8 -0.80% -1.32 
 
-8 -0.95% -0.83 
-7 0.72% 1.18 
 
-7 1.46% 1.20 
-6 0.19% 0.13 
 
-6 0.60% 1.37 
-5 -0.35% -0.70 
 
-5 -0.05% -0.24 
-4 0.02% -0.05 
 
-4 2.12% 1.64 
-3 0.57% 0.58 
 
-3 0.26% 0.06 
-2 0.36% 0.99 
 
-2 2.87% **2.40 
-1 -0.06% -0.19 
 
-1 1.39% 1.31 
0 -0.33% -0.71 
 
0 0.35% 0.91 
1 0.20% 0.19 
 
1 -0.65% -0.38 
2 1.61% 1.28 
 
2 -1.07% -1.06 
3 0.18% 0.14 
 
3 0.90% 0.82 
4 1.42% **2.15 
 
4 0.63% 0.95 
5 0.02% 0.60 
 
5 -0.18% -0.32 
6 0.40% 0.55 
 
6 1.22% **2.29 
7 -0.29% -0.72 
 
7 1.40% 1.04 
8 0.77% 1.43 
 
8 1.03% *1.74 
9 1.23% 0.72 
 
9 0.21% 0.18 
10 0.73% 0.68 
 
10 0.24% -0.07 
       
       Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Day CAR tAB 
 
Day CAR tAB 
-3 0.57% 0.75 
 
-3 0.26% 0.27 
-2 0.92% 1.11 
 
-2 3.13% *1.87 
-1 0.87% 1.02 
 
-1 4.52% *1.95 
0 0.53% 0.32 
 
0 4.87% 1.66 
1 0.73% 0.41 
 
1 4.23% 1.62 
2 2.34% 0.83 
 
2 3.15% 0.79 
3 2.52% 1.11 
 
3 4.05% 1.31 
   
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level 




Panel 6.2.A – Effect of a rating cut in the bank’s equity price 
Methodologies used: simple variance and test statistics, without grouping by blocks of days or 









Day AR tAB without blocks 
tAB with country 
blocks 
-10 -0.22% -0.83 -0.81 
-9 1.36% ***2.71 ***2.67 
-8 1.36% -1.30 -1.40 
-7 0.30% 0.84 0.85 
-6 0.09% 0.22 0.14 
-5 0.06% -0.34 -0.33 
-4 0.52% 0.76 0.71 
-3 0.06% 0.00 0.08 
-2 0.19% 0.10 0.23 
-1 0.02% 0.14 0.13 
0 -1.36% -1.50 -1.46 
1 0.40% 0.47 0.43 
2 0.48% 0.18 0.23 
3 0.37% 0.37 0.26 
4 1.22% **2.04 **2.37 
5 0.31% 1.18 1.27 
6 0.92% 0.83 0.91 
7 -0.10% -1.00 -1.05 
8 0.61% 1.04 1.23 
9 1.33% 0.58 0.53 
10 0.39% 0.68 0.76 
  
     
   
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Day CAR tAB without blocks 
tAB with country 
blocks 
-3 0.06% 0.16 0.25 
-2 0.25% 0.10 0.12 
-1 0.27% 0.17 0.30 
0 -1.09% -0.24 -0.42 
1 -0.69% -0.16 -0.34 
2 -0.21% -0.15 -0.22 
3 0.16% 0.08 0.18 
    
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% 





Panel 6.2.B – Effect of a rating cut of at least 2 notches in the bank’s equity 
price 
Methodology used: simple variance and test statistics, without grouping by blocks of days or countries. 
Number of observations: 38 (number of rating cuts of at least 2 notches). 
 
Abnormal Returns 
Day AR tAB without blocks 
-10 1.46% 0.31 
-9 1.35% 0.33 
-8 -0.11% -0.07 
-7 1.51% 0.33 
-6 -0.73% -0.06 
-5 1.00% 0.07 
-4 0.53% 0.03 
-3 0.29% 0.06 
-2 -1.02% -0.26 
-1 -0.22% -0.08 
0 -1.59% -0.25 
1 0.41% 0.04 
2 1.97% 0.18 
3 -0.26% -0.15 
4 2.48% 0.43 
5 -0.70% 0.03 
6 0.45% 0.02 
7 -0.19% -0.04 
8 1.09% 0.24 
9 1.45% 0.12 







Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Day CAR tAB without blocks 
-3 0.29% 0.01 
-2 -0.73% -0.16 
-1 -0.95% -0.15 
0 -2.55% -0.27 
1 -2.14% -0.28 
2 -0.17% -0.11 
3 -0.42% -0.17 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 
10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and *** 







Panel 6.3 – Effect of a downgrade on the bank’s equity price, by country 
Abnormal Returns 
  Greece Portugal United States Switzerland France 
# events 28 22 53 6 11 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 -0.68% -0.38 2.01% **2.21 -3.62% -1.07 -0.21% -0.38 0.90% 1.26 
-9 0.30% 0.51 0.15% 0.07 4.11% **2.22 0.04% 0.42 1.28% 1.04 
-8 0.52% 0.28 -0.23% -0.63 -3.36% **-2.59 1.41% 0.48 0.69% 1.07 
-7 -0.25% -0.06 -0.50% -0.74 1.29% 0.28 0.65% 0.71 1.19% 1.27 
-6 -2.23% -1.95 0.12% -0.20 0.55% 0.37 0.93% 1.24 -1.35% -0.86 
-5 0.32% -0.04 1.37% 0.91 -0.50% -0.45 -1.40% -1.09 -0.16% -0.64 
-4 -1.86% -1.14 -0.47% -1.16 0.58% 0.49 0.51% 0.71 0.22% -0.19 
-3 -0.58% -0.46 -0.46% -1.01 2.16% 0.83 0.51% 0.79 0.80% 0.97 
-2 0.11% 0.12 -0.46% 0.08 -0.37% -0.30 -0.16% 0.32 4.14% 1.66 
-1 1.32% 0.62 -0.77% -1.01 -0.15% 0.21 -3.02% -0.80 1.85% 1.61 
0 -1.58% -0.94 -1.15% -1.49 0.50% 0.10 1.31% 0.49 -0.66% -0.64 
1 0.22% 0.00 -0.29% -0.91 2.22% 1.56 -1.29% -1.27 -1.56% -1.65 
2 3.15% 1.26 0.96% 1.23 2.93% 0.78 2.22% 0.78 -0.39% -0.11 
3 0.46% 0.20 0.73% 0.57 -0.10% 0.09 2.41% ***4.61 -0.19% 0.19 
4 3.72% 3.02 -0.04% 0.37 3.43% 1.18 -0.08% -0.36 -0.92% -1.08 
5 -1.48% -0.47 0.11% 0.52 -0.60% -0.07 4.93% ***2.69 -1.02% -0.81 
6 -1.65% *-1.83 1.19% 0.62 1.58% 1.47 -1.15% -1.16 0.43% -0.10 
7 -0.62% -0.49 -0.69% -0.46 -0.88% -0.42 -0.59% -0.41 2.24% 1.09 
8 -0.48% -0.72 1.21% **2.16 1.97% *1.73 1.28% 1.17 1.65% 1.12 
9 3.48% **2.32 1.12% 0.49 1.13% 0.09 1.15% 1.24 2.77% 1.63 
10 0.72% 0.39 0.30% 0.03 1.34% 0.71 -0.20% -0.13 -0.76% -0.22 
           
Abnormal Returns 
  Greece Portugal United States Switzerland France 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.58% 0.04 -0.46% -1.34 2.16% 0.72 0.51% 0.82 0.80% 1.05 
-2 -0.46% -0.27 -0.92% -0.83 1.79% 0.64 0.35% 0.78 4.94% *1.96 
-1 0.86% 0.61 -1.70% -1.19 1.64% 0.62 -2.67% 0.11 6.78% *1.97 
0 -0.72% -0.11 -2.84% *-1.93 2.14% 0.54 -1.36% 0.51 6.12% 1.06 
1 -0.50% -0.66 -3.14% *-1.91 4.36% 1.46 -2.64% 0.22 4.56% 0.71 
2 2.65% 0.37 -2.17% -1.43 7.29% 1.39 -0.43% 0.51 4.17% 0.79 
3 3.11% 0.41 -1.44% -1.09 7.19% 1.52 1.98% 1.28 3.98% 0.88 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence 
level and *** if with 1% confidence level. 
 





  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy 
# events 11 37 7 24 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 -1.29% **-2.00 -0.62% **-2.10 1.08% -0.55 -0.32% -0.57 
-9 -0.23% 0.19 0.40% 0.85 0.49% 1.29 0.58% 1.02 
-8 1.22% 0.07 -0.33% -0.34 1.21% 1.29 -0.83% -0.35 
-7 1.55% 0.41 0.21% 1.20 1.30% 1.30 1.89% 1.93 
-6 0.89% -0.06 0.21% 0.48 1.13% 0.75 2.19% **2.06 
-5 -5.77% **-2.39 -0.03% -0.16 -3.36% *-1.71 0.77% 1.06 
-4 -0.92% -1.35 0.28% 0.32 -0.21% 0.88 1.44% 1.36 
-3 0.36% 0.94 0.08% -0.49 -1.61% -0.79 0.46% 0.57 
-2 1.15% 1.11 -0.10% 0.39 -0.70% -0.43 2.38% **2.49 
-1 -1.46% -0.16 -0.47% **-2.03 0.81% 0.68 0.09% 0.32 
0 -3.46% -0.67 0.23% 0.28 0.23% -0.32 0.15% -0.60 
1 -3.18% -0.17 -0.41% -0.16 3.81% 1.00 -0.96% *-1.93 
2 2.72% 0.51 -0.07% -0.36 2.03% 0.08 0.15% -0.04 
3 -3.89% 0.27 -0.50% -1.54 5.01% **2.45 1.27% 0.40 
4 -3.64% 0.23 0.74% 0.95 -1.47% **-1.93 1.43% **2.00 
5 -0.62% -0.49 0.62% 1.58 2.93% 0.51 0.48% 0.57 
6 0.31% -0.49 -0.01% -0.42 -2.17% -0.88 1.04% 1.61 
7 -1.14% -0.82 0.14% -0.63 0.52% -0.14 0.26% 0.00 
8 3.44% *1.77 -0.46% -1.48 1.36% 0.57 -0.84% -0.43 
9 1.14% -0.73 -0.68% **-2.36 4.09% ***6.17 0.46% -0.10 
10 7.05% **2.37 -0.03% -0.09 -1.03% -0.28 -0.42% -0.35 
         
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.36% 0.92 0.08% -0.08 -1.61% -1.08 0.46% 0.00 
-2 1.51% 1.25 -0.02% 0.47 -2.31% -0.84 2.85% 1.51 
-1 0.05% 0.81 -0.48% -0.45 -1.50% -0.56 2.94% 0.78 
0 -3.41% 0.23 -0.25% -0.42 -1.26% -1.22 3.09% 0.51 
1 -6.59% 0.50 -0.66% -0.52 2.55% -0.38 2.13% -0.32 
2 -3.88% 0.83 -0.73% -0.86 4.58% -0.70 2.28% -0.21 





Panel 6.4 – Effect of a downgrade on the bank’s equity price (shorter event 
window) 
Methodologies used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics; sample variance 





tAB with country 
blocks 
-5 0.06% -0.24 0.34 
-4 0.52% 0.61 -0.05 
-3 0.06% 0.06 -0.27 
-2 0.19% 0.13 -0.66 
-1 0.02% 0.01 0.54 
0 -1.36% -1.33 -0.72 
1 0.40% 0.30 0.71 
2 0.48% 0.03 0.04 
3 0.37% 0.35 -0.16 
4 1.22% *1.88 1.17 








tAB with country 
blocks 
-2 0.19% 0.24 -0.15 
-1 0.21% 0.21 -0.15 
0 -1.15% -0.61 -0.22 
1 -0.75% -0.35 -0.20 
2 -0.27% -0.12 -0.16 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% 







Appendix 7 – Results for Q2 (Sovereign rating changes effect) 






Own country banks 
General results, 2 
methodologies 
Panel 7.1 
Including all the 
events, by country 














Panel 7.1 – Effect of a sovereign downgrade in the country’s banks 
Methodologies used: day blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics; no blocks to compute 
variance and statistics. Includes all downgrade events. Number of observations: 198 (43 events). 
Day AR tAB without blocks tAB with day blocks 
-10 1.64% **2.48 ***2.69 
-9 0.95% 0.92 0.99 
-8 -1.27% 1.38 1.30 
-7 0.15% -0.15 -0.14 
-6 0.40% 0.30 0.29 
-5 -0.41% 0.39 0.35 
-4 -1.00% 0.28 0.27 
-3 -1.24% -0.97 -0.80 
-2 1.03% 0.83 0.73 
-1 -1.00% 0.36 0.32 
0 -0.62% -0.88 -0.73 
1 -0.23% -0.64 -0.83 
2 -0.05% 0.70 0.75 
3 0.14% -0.31 -0.34 
4 0.75% **2.59 **2.34 
5 1.34% 0.63 0.77 
6 0.04% 0.75 0.63 
7 -0.51% 0.44 0.40 
8 -0.79% 0.70 0.56 
9 -0.52% 0.05 0.03 
10 1.03% 1.12 1.02 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% 






Panel 7.2 – Effect of a sovereign downgrade in the country’s banks, by country 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics; all downgrades. 
 
France Italy Spain 
# events 2 downgrades x 3 banks 3 downgrades x 5 banks 8 downgrades x 5 banks 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 1.58% 0.46 -1.59% -0.93 0.15% -0.08 
-9 0.21% -0.04 -1.06% -0.78 0.23% 0.13 
-8 1.90% 0.94 1.41% 0.62 0.02% 0.28 
-7 0.09% 0.22 -1.17% -0.14 0.44% 0.22 
-6 -1.50% -0.58 -5.85% -2.43 -0.04% -0.24 
-5 0.13% 0.09 -2.88% -0.69 -0.87% -0.86 
-4 -2.12% **-2.32 -0.83% 0.01 -0.18% -0.31 
-3 0.61% 0.04 2.06% 0.54 -0.52% -0.25 
-2 -0.79% -0.54 2.88% 0.87 0.39% 0.11 
-1 2.94% 0.82 2.98% 0.66 0.03% 0.15 
0 1.38% 0.61 1.17% 0.43 -1.24% -0.93 
1 1.67% 0.40 1.17% 0.80 -0.15% -0.09 
2 -0.58% -0.48 -1.28% -0.44 -0.36% -0.41 
3 1.30% 0.20 -2.79% -1.26 -0.48% -0.36 
4 5.76% **2.14 5.20% 1.24 0.47% 1.18 
5 1.15% 0.55 0.61% 0.14 0.11% -0.29 
6 2.70% 0.52 3.80% 1.07 -0.30% -0.34 
7 -3.37% -1.84 0.60% 0.15 0.88% 0.45 
8 -1.19% -0.22 4.15% 1.27 1.52% 0.88 
9 -0.16% -0.12 1.25% 0.17 0.55% 0.46 
10 0.94% 0.30 -0.02% 0.17 0.58% 0.39 
  
     
  
 
Portugal Greece United States 
# events 8 downgrades x 3 banks 12 downgrades x 6 banks 2 downgrades x 17 banks 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 2.53% **2.24 2.83% *1.77 1.08% ***2.63 
-9 1.12% 1.50 2.37% 0.87 0.14% 0.29 
-8 1.66% **2.09 -5.05% -0.01 1.00% **2.30 
-7 -1.43% -0.53 1.36% 0.52 -1.54% *-1.69 
-6 -0.19% 0.27 2.37% 1.10 -0.12% -0.19 
-5 0.89% 0.58 -0.82% 0.41 0.75% **2.53 
-4 0.14% 0.68 -2.41% 0.76 -0.62% -1.10 
-3 0.06% 0.80 -2.27% -0.27 -2.71% ***-3.48 
-2 -0.77% -1.38 2.16% 0.95 0.51% 0.35 
-1 0.76% 0.18 -2.87% 0.24 -2.30% -1.19 
0 -0.42% -0.45 -0.77% -0.25 -1.12% -0.74 
1 -1.31% -0.74 1.75% 0.39 -5.49% ***-3.30 
2 1.01% 0.62 -1.45% 0.77 2.74% 0.94 
3 1.38% *1.75 2.08% 0.54 -3.63% -0.79 
4 0.45% 0.54 -2.13% 0.01 3.70% **2.12 
5 -1.42% -1.54 3.90% 1.06 0.22% 1.09 
6 -0.14% 0.34 -1.58% 0.03 1.72% 1.01 
7 -0.05% 1.05 -0.89% 0.61 -1.07% -0.63 
8 0.10% -0.26 -4.10% 0.00 0.38% 0.15 
9 2.65% 1.60 -1.48% 0.41 -3.47% ***-4.01 
10 0.54% 1.45 2.79% 0.99 -1.08% -0.62 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, 
** if with 5% confidence level and *** if with 1% confidence level. 
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Panel 7.3 – Effect of a sovereign downgrade in the country’s banks, by country – new 
event window 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics; all downgrades. 
 
France Italy Spain 
# events 2 downgrades x 3 banks 3 downgrades x 5 banks 8 downgrades x 5 banks 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 0.13% 0.18 -2.88% -1.12 -0.87% -1.42 
-4 -2.12% ***-3.67 -0.83% -0.01 -0.18% -0.38 
-3 0.61% 0.11 2.06% 0.82 -0.52% -0.60 
-2 -0.79% -0.91 2.88% 1.41 0.39% 0.11 
-1 2.94% **1.84 2.98% 1.20 0.03% -0.16 
0 1.38% 1.08 1.17% 0.61 -1.24% -1.20 
1 1.67% 0.83 1.17% 1.08 -0.15% -0.08 
2 -0.58% -0.84 -1.28% -0.66 -0.36% -0.70 
3 1.30% 0.37 -2.79% **-1.89 -0.48% -0.73 
4 5.76% ***3.35 5.20% **1.76 0.47% 1.15 
5 1.15% 0.95 0.61% 0.29 0.11% -0.83 
  
     
  
 
Portugal Greece United States 
# events 8 downgrades x 3 banks 12 downgrades x 6 banks 2 downgrades x 17 banks 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 0.89% 0.42 -0.82% 0.54 0.75% 0.61 
-4 0.14% 0.61 -2.41% 0.71 -0.62% -0.26 
-3 0.06% 0.60 -2.27% -0.46 -2.71% -0.89 
-2 -0.77% **-2.01 2.16% 1.36 0.51% 0.08 
-1 0.76% 0.17 -2.87% 0.28 -2.30% -0.27 
0 -0.42% -0.60 -0.77% -0.35 -1.12% -0.18 
1 -1.31% -0.93 1.75% 0.62 -5.49% -0.90 
2 1.01% 0.45 -1.45% 0.85 2.74% 0.30 
3 1.38% *1.70 2.08% 0.59 -3.63% -0.21 
4 0.45% 0.80 -2.13% -0.03 3.70% 0.51 
5 -1.42% **-2.13 3.90% 1.34 0.22% 0.27 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 







Panel 7.4.A – Cross effects originating from Spain’s sovereign downgrades 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Spain France Italy Germany Portugal 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 0.15% -0.08 1.17% 0.60 0.58% 0.14 0.26% 0.15 0.83% 0.52 
-9 0.23% 0.13 0.65% -0.02 0.25% 0.27 -0.67% -0.78 0.90% 0.98 
-8 0.02% 0.28 0.40% 0.20 -0.08% -0.19 0.66% 0.36 0.91% 1.03 
-7 0.44% 0.22 1.41% *1.74 0.82% 1.11 -0.04% 0.53 -1.02% -0.25 
-6 -0.04% -0.24 0.76% 0.13 -0.63% -0.17 0.22% 0.29 0.36% 1.09 
-5 -0.87% -0.86 -0.57% -0.30 -0.15% 0.26 -0.74% -0.43 0.38% 0.60 
-4 -0.18% -0.31 -0.27% -0.95 -0.76% -0.38 -1.27% -1.79 0.08% 0.42 
-3 -0.52% -0.25 -1.18% -0.34 0.44% 0.43 -1.82% ***-2.67 0.61% 0.84 
-2 0.39% 0.11 0.30% 0.14 1.02% 0.56 -1.55% -0.52 -0.81% -0.68 
-1 0.03% 0.15 1.53% 1.01 1.67% 0.98 -0.26% 0.33 1.71% *1.74 
0 -1.24% -0.93 -0.90% -0.54 -1.40% -0.98 -1.44% -0.93 -0.38% -0.42 
1 -0.15% -0.09 -0.64% 0.22 0.45% 0.72 -0.73% -0.03 0.79% 0.35 
2 -0.36% -0.41 -0.30% -0.21 -1.08% -0.90 -0.98% -0.50 0.55% 0.36 
3 -0.48% -0.36 0.07% 0.01 -1.52% -1.51 -1.13% -1.06 -0.01% 0.01 
4 0.47% 1.18 0.77% 0.73 1.53% 1.23 1.08% 1.09 0.37% 0.64 
5 0.11% -0.29 0.59% -0.14 -1.33% -1.10 0.02% -0.42 -0.82% -0.83 
6 -0.30% -0.34 -0.39% 0.17 0.52% 0.18 0.93% 0.92 -0.17% 0.25 
7 0.88% 0.45 0.88% -0.32 0.63% 0.23 3.32% 0.63 -0.18% 0.20 
8 1.52% 0.88 2.19% 0.40 2.38% 1.44 2.46% *2.00 1.67% 1.14 
9 0.55% 0.46 -0.20% 0.01 0.76% 0.14 0.12% -0.12 0.00% -0.03 
10 0.58% 0.39 2.30% 1.19 0.74% 1.18 1.58% 1.67 0.86% 1.85 
  
         
  
  Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 1.45% -0.35 1.72% 0.79 0.49% -0.06 3.01% 1.32 1.69% **2.32 
-9 1.22% 1.67 -0.57% -0.68 0.42% -0.21 1.16% 0.62 -0.69% *-1.69 
-8 1.68% 1.89 0.50% 0.46 0.64% 0.14 0.88% 1.27 -0.43% -0.03 
-7 1.62% 0.90 1.67% 0.83 1.87% 1.66 -0.36% 0.89 1.42% 0.80 
-6 4.41% ***2.83 0.74% 0.19 1.37% 0.33 1.27% 1.24 0.92% 0.74 
-5 1.37% 1.15 0.89% 0.52 1.69% 0.98 -0.83% -0.04 0.01% 0.18 
-4 2.01% 0.92 -1.30% -0.95 -1.24% -1.07 -0.97% -0.31 0.49% 0.26 
-3 -0.43% -0.36 -0.96% -0.45 -0.15% 0.63 -1.21% 0.17 0.44% 1.14 
-2 1.99% 0.23 0.39% -0.32 0.54% 0.37 -3.12% -0.53 -0.56% -0.16 
-1 -1.54% -0.43 0.93% 0.76 -0.31% 0.33 2.24% 1.23 -0.29% 0.11 
0 -9.10% -1.05 -1.61% -1.17 -3.79% -0.16 0.44% -0.05 -3.50% -0.60 
1 4.37% 1.52 -0.82% 0.30 -1.23% 0.51 2.48% 1.31 2.71% 0.81 
2 -1.42% -0.40 -0.44% -0.65 -1.13% -0.66 -0.08% 0.51 -1.81% -0.72 
3 -1.42% -0.64 1.63% 0.45 -0.67% -0.18 0.68% 0.31 0.96% 0.59 
4 3.97% 1.10 1.41% 1.61 0.22% *1.68 1.72% 1.17 -0.95% -0.41 
5 -6.35% -1.04 0.24% -0.04 -2.62% -1.09 1.58% 0.12 -2.18% -0.41 
6 4.30% 0.29 -0.43% 0.53 -1.20% -0.10 2.19% 1.16 3.35% 0.06 
7 3.71% 0.56 2.38% 0.39 4.54% 0.88 -3.96% -0.24 -1.10% -0.17 
8 -4.33% -0.44 1.16% 0.61 -0.73% -0.31 5.75% ***2.71 0.12% -0.27 
9 5.19% 1.04 0.83% 0.19 0.92% 0.48 4.71% 1.24 -0.08% -0.41 
10 3.23% -0.03 1.07% 0.56 3.48% 0.92 0.03% 0.21 0.61% 0.23 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and *** if 
with 1% confidence level. 
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Panel 7.4.B – Cross effects originating from Ireland’s sovereign downgrades 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
 
Ireland France Italy Germany Spain 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 4.63% 1.03 1.79% 0.92 0.41% 0.95 0.82% 0.12 0.95% 0.77 
-9 -1.11% 0.12 0.81% 0.72 0.33% 0.29 -0.37% 0.22 0.72% 0.39 
-8 0.64% -0.09 0.46% 0.02 1.38% 1.12 0.84% 0.28 1.24% 1.14 
-7 2.62% 0.29 1.11% 1.50 0.83% 0.74 1.57% 1.32 0.80% 0.49 
-6 2.37% 0.23 0.78% 0.34 -0.10% -0.34 0.09% -0.07 0.09% 0.08 
-5 1.41% 0.85 1.17% 0.47 1.76% 1.08 1.97% 1.53 1.24% 0.79 
-4 3.64% *1.81 0.43% 1.01 0.82% 0.40 1.25% 0.73 1.14% 1.16 
-3 -0.68% -0.22 0.00% 0.27 -0.59% -1.11 -0.03% -0.64 -0.11% -0.23 
-2 -0.63% -0.87 -0.42% -0.50 0.98% 0.45 1.08% 0.80 0.40% 0.09 
-1 0.65% 0.84 0.26% -0.14 0.20% -0.03 2.06% 1.31 -0.06% -0.15 
0 0.65% -0.02 -0.77% -0.29 -0.02% 0.40 -2.87% -0.91 -0.30% 0.03 
1 3.65% *1.74 0.39% -0.28 1.11% 0.47 1.06% 0.32 1.30% 0.99 
2 1.96% 1.28 0.33% 0.01 0.93% 0.55 0.89% 0.44 0.10% -0.31 
3 3.01% 0.70 1.58% 0.74 1.75% 0.79 1.47% 0.45 1.82% 1.10 
4 4.94% 1.06 0.44% 0.08 0.69% -0.09 0.49% -0.14 0.63% 0.74 
5 -1.20% -0.58 -0.54% -0.65 -1.27% -1.31 -1.26% -1.54 -0.07% -0.13 
6 0.60% -0.26 -0.42% -0.33 -0.19% -0.14 -0.75% -0.83 0.24% 0.25 
7 -3.27% -1.10 -0.12% -0.50 0.29% 0.09 -0.62% -0.66 0.28% 0.06 
8 1.07% 0.70 0.01% -0.14 1.18% 0.39 1.88% 0.47 1.14% 0.68 
9 2.58% 0.45 1.19% 0.34 1.06% 0.23 0.97% -0.06 1.09% 0.44 
10 -0.35% -0.62 0.35% 0.40 0.63% 0.56 -1.25% -0.87 0.51% 0.23 
  
         
  
 
Portugal Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 1.98% 1.57 0.10% -0.40 0.63% -0.05 1.00% 0.72 0.56% -0.34 
-9 0.06% 0.81 0.02% -0.16 -0.86% -0.57 -0.03% -0.17 -0.98% -1.30 
-8 0.19% -0.82 0.96% 0.80 0.06% 0.10 1.53% 1.05 1.06% 1.55 
-7 -0.59% -0.29 0.98% 1.21 1.14% 0.42 1.73% 1.52 -1.40% -1.03 
-6 -0.63% -1.09 0.61% 0.46 0.94% 0.93 0.68% 0.23 -0.59% -0.58 
-5 0.90% 1.25 1.04% 1.00 1.17% 0.46 2.51% 1.96 0.89% 0.77 
-4 -0.19% -0.08 0.66% 0.98 -1.00% -0.76 -0.27% -0.34 -0.80% -0.16 
-3 -0.60% -0.32 -0.53% -0.67 -0.40% -0.72 0.05% 0.05 0.07% 0.64 
-2 -0.21% 0.26 -0.75% -1.08 0.95% -0.14 -0.60% -0.27 -0.33% -0.06 
-1 1.07% 0.34 -0.41% -0.11 2.19% 1.07 0.05% -0.09 -3.80% -1.09 
0 0.07% -0.20 -0.98% -0.84 -0.46% 0.19 -0.02% 0.04 1.98% 0.31 
1 0.39% 0.80 1.22% 0.61 0.66% 0.25 1.17% 0.92 -0.56% -0.15 
2 0.27% 0.12 1.39% 1.22 0.91% 1.08 -0.45% -0.25 1.56% 0.52 
3 1.77% 1.10 1.48% *1.93 0.97% 0.96 2.10% 0.84 -0.84% -0.64 
4 0.89% 1.10 0.89% 1.33 1.15% 1.15 1.41% 0.82 1.70% 1.00 
5 -0.23% 0.12 -1.29% *-1.75 0.13% -0.04 -2.04% -0.75 1.69% -0.45 
6 -0.61% -0.68 -0.43% 0.02 0.35% 0.84 -1.26% -0.74 -0.59% 0.62 
7 -1.30% *-1.71 -0.14% -0.84 0.15% 0.22 2.07% 0.74 -0.93% -0.38 
8 0.99% 0.23 1.81% 1.16 0.78% 0.43 2.32% 1.28 -0.67% -0.85 
9 0.59% 0.61 0.43% -0.81 1.05% 0.22 -2.77% -1.24 0.35% 0.80 
10 0.10% 0.16 -0.70% -0.54 -0.54% -0.26 0.61% 0.41 -0.46% -0.73 
 




Panel 7.4.C – Cross effects originating from Italy’s sovereign downgrades 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
 
Italy France Ireland Germany Spain 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 -1.59% -0.93 0.43% 0.25 -2.88% -1.24 -0.96% -0.39 -0.48% -0.38 
-9 -1.06% -0.78 -0.80% -0.43 1.44% 1.35 -1.74% -0.44 -0.05% -0.13 
-8 1.41% 0.62 0.98% 0.49 1.17% 1.15 1.81% ***2.85 -0.32% -0.34 
-7 -1.17% -0.14 0.69% 0.54 -1.78% -1.19 -0.31% -0.34 -0.37% -0.13 
-6 -5.85% **-2.43 -1.99% -1.00 0.06% 0.06 -1.45% -0.56 -2.01% -1.54 
-5 -2.88% -0.69 -2.33% -0.54 2.77% 1.08 -2.18% -0.70 -0.43% -0.21 
-4 -0.83% 0.01 0.76% 0.03 2.15% 1.81 0.36% 0.24 -0.06% -0.03 
-3 2.06% 0.54 -0.02% -0.02 2.71% ***7.62 1.12% 1.17 2.17% 0.69 
-2 2.88% 0.87 0.31% -0.09 -6.02% -1.45 1.30% 0.99 -0.23% -0.23 
-1 2.98% 0.66 0.05% 0.11 1.62% 0.69 2.82% *1.75 0.43% 0.39 
0 1.17% 0.43 0.89% 0.36 2.05% 1.08 -1.03% -0.60 0.88% 0.54 
1 1.17% 0.80 -0.43% 0.02 0.51% 0.39 0.66% ***3.26 0.52% 0.57 
2 -1.28% -0.44 -0.01% -0.23 0.89% 1.48 0.15% 0.03 -0.32% -0.26 
3 -2.79% -1.26 0.55% 0.13 0.47% 0.24 -1.44% -0.23 0.34% 0.14 
4 5.20% 1.24 5.58% **2.18 7.00% **2.33 5.20% 1.76 2.28% 1.25 
5 0.61% 0.14 1.21% 0.78 -1.40% -0.50 1.55% 0.48 -0.23% -0.16 
6 3.80% 1.07 4.16% 1.02 1.00% 0.57 4.23% 1.07 0.11% 0.00 
7 0.60% 0.15 -2.06% -1.43 -0.24% -0.15 0.53% 0.02 0.20% 0.28 
8 4.15% 1.27 0.15% -0.06 -0.92% -1.01 2.10% 1.46 0.33% 0.37 
9 1.25% 0.17 -0.04% -0.08 1.42% 0.63 -1.47% -0.62 1.29% 0.66 
10 -0.02% 0.17 0.90% 0.37 0.36% 0.11 0.31% 0.17 1.04% 0.71 
  
         
  
 
Portugal Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 3.23% 0.84 -1.12% -0.17 -2.06% -1.27 -2.99% -0.92 -0.43% 0.44 
-9 -0.53% -0.55 1.03% 0.50 -0.41% -0.08 1.56% 0.22 -1.83% -1.16 
-8 2.02% 0.59 2.27% **2.36 2.95% 1.67 6.75% **2.01 3.67% *1.94 
-7 -4.93% **-2.15 1.17% 0.90 0.86% 0.62 -4.41% **-2.32 -1.92% -1.32 
-6 -1.93% -1.01 -1.72% -1.19 -1.06% -0.40 2.13% 0.80 -0.53% 0.11 
-5 1.50% 0.35 -0.35% -0.44 0.44% 0.28 -0.36% -0.04 0.25% 0.05 
-4 -0.37% -0.30 0.00% -0.24 -0.26% -0.57 -1.79% -0.65 0.60% 0.26 
-3 -0.05% 0.25 1.03% 1.29 3.15% 1.36 1.19% 0.15 3.06% *1.86 
-2 -0.52% -0.01 -2.42% -0.27 1.24% 0.54 -0.38% -0.25 1.38% 0.50 
-1 3.33% 0.61 2.80% 1.99 2.53% 1.05 4.33% 1.74 0.64% 0.33 
0 0.76% 0.17 -1.08% -0.48 0.05% 0.08 1.38% 0.39 -0.88% -0.17 
1 -1.27% -0.34 1.04% 1.03 0.79% 0.29 -1.15% -0.27 -0.54% -0.25 
2 0.53% 0.17 1.01% 0.08 0.78% 0.24 0.48% 0.04 -1.07% -0.09 
3 0.82% 0.44 -0.31% -0.01 -2.33% -1.28 3.03% 0.27 -2.24% -0.75 
4 1.37% 0.47 3.62% ***4.23 5.15% **2.56 0.25% -0.06 1.45% 0.44 
5 -1.30% -1.09 1.42% 0.59 0.22% -0.20 -3.46% -0.85 1.38% 0.29 
6 -0.63% 0.01 1.90% 0.84 2.26% 1.36 5.38% 1.32 0.29% -0.06 
7 -1.54% -0.66 -0.26% -0.11 -1.75% -1.35 -1.15% -0.37 -1.04% -0.27 
8 1.57% 1.14 0.86% 0.62 0.04% -0.04 6.33% 1.59 0.67% -0.09 
9 1.80% 0.96 -1.35% -1.79 0.32% 0.11 5.46% 0.44 -1.26% -0.32 
10 -0.47% -0.35 -0.59% -0.56 -1.04% -0.98 -1.33% -0.39 -3.31% -1.60 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and *** if 
with 1% confidence level. 
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Panel 7.4.D – Cross effects originating from Greece’s sovereign downgrades 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Greece France Italy Germany Portugal 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 2.83% *1.77 -0.06% -0.20 0.70% 0.61 0.43% -0.90 0.53% 1.02 
-9 2.37% 0.87 0.07% -0.32 0.43% 0.58 0.68% 0.42 0.30% 0.57 
-8 -5.05% -0.01 0.89% 0.27 0.86% 1.22 0.79% -0.11 0.27% 0.35 
-7 1.36% 0.52 -0.21% -0.45 -0.29% -0.43 0.07% -0.22 0.08% 0.29 
-6 2.37% 1.10 1.57% **2.20 1.34% **2.07 1.13% 2.54 0.94% 1.27 
-5 -0.82% 0.41 1.01% 0.31 0.76% 0.13 0.93% 0.65 0.15% -1.09 
-4 -2.41% 0.76 0.48% 0.91 1.53% *1.73 -0.56% -0.23 0.05% 0.25 
-3 -2.27% -0.27 -0.49% -1.62 -0.54% -1.04 -1.40% ***-3.53 -0.18% 0.04 
-2 2.16% 0.95 -0.35% -0.51 -0.37% -0.31 -0.42% -0.38 0.35% 1.28 
-1 -2.87% 0.24 0.66% 0.88 0.95% 1.64 0.11% 1.01 0.08% 0.53 
0 -0.77% -0.25 -1.55% -1.00 -1.76% **-2.06 -1.91% -1.12 -1.36% **-2.03 
1 1.75% 0.39 0.39% 0.65 0.18% 0.66 -0.15% 0.94 0.37% 0.40 
2 -1.45% 0.77 -0.15% -0.76 -0.45% -0.94 -0.39% -1.18 0.47% 0.00 
3 2.08% 0.54 -1.23% -0.27 -1.26% -1.56 -1.56% -1.08 -0.26% -0.32 
4 -2.13% 0.01 -1.05% -0.42 -0.07% 0.61 -1.52% -1.44 0.31% 0.75 
5 3.90% 1.06 -0.22% -0.52 -0.20% -0.20 -0.42% -0.25 -0.19% 0.25 
6 -1.58% 0.03 -1.06% -0.95 -0.62% -0.10 -0.46% -0.26 -0.20% -0.13 
7 -0.89% 0.61 -0.99% 0.22 -0.14% 0.05 -0.29% 0.05 0.07% 0.69 
8 -4.10% 0.00 0.92% 0.03 0.67% 0.54 0.72% -0.08 -0.08% -0.20 
9 -1.48% 0.41 1.37% -0.58 0.69% 0.11 1.09% 0.32 1.17% 1.04 
10 2.79% 0.99 -0.18% -0.64 -0.13% -0.29 0.85% -0.63 -0.39% -0.19 
  
         
  
  Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom Spain United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 -0.57% -1.38 0.67% 0.08 0.86% **2.06 0.12% 0.49 0.50% -0.27 
-9 2.16% 1.20 0.42% 0.26 0.54% 0.06 0.28% 0.17 0.77% 0.37 
-8 -3.33% -1.24 0.39% 0.64 1.06% 0.43 0.52% 0.42 0.31% 0.28 
-7 0.64% 1.07 0.56% -0.79 -0.99% **-2.17 -0.24% -0.25 -0.18% -0.61 
-6 3.09% **2.23 0.77% 0.90 0.90% 1.24 1.12% *1.88 0.51% -0.53 
-5 -0.76% -0.23 0.47% -0.16 0.82% 0.42 0.58% 0.01 0.65% 0.97 
-4 -0.11% -0.37 1.19% 0.31 1.02% 0.84 0.48% 0.74 0.27% -0.04 
-3 1.03% -0.58 -0.28% -1.49 -0.09% -0.54 -0.20% -0.32 0.00% -0.53 
-2 -0.24% -0.46 -0.45% -0.81 0.64% -0.15 -0.52% -0.77 -0.92% -0.92 
-1 1.64% 1.56 0.50% 1.23 0.83% 1.07 0.36% 1.24 0.23% -0.31 
0 -2.34% *-1.89 -0.76% -0.47 -1.37% -1.14 -0.88% -0.95 -0.56% 0.32 
1 2.03% 1.46 -0.07% -0.19 0.04% -0.19 0.07% 0.33 -0.56% 0.18 
2 3.23% 1.16 -0.38% -1.65 -1.60% -1.64 -0.48% -1.59 0.20% 0.07 
3 -4.97% -0.51 -1.77% **-2.26 -3.93% 0.00 -0.80% -0.91 -2.32% -0.58 
4 2.92% 0.50 -0.30% 0.67 -2.21% -1.46 0.02% 0.61 1.01% 0.59 
5 -2.56% *-1.76 -0.16% -0.37 -0.80% -0.63 -0.28% -0.28 -0.72% -0.61 
6 -10.47% **-2.42 -0.12% -0.93 -4.12% *-1.70 -0.62% -0.68 -1.96% -0.88 
7 4.98% 0.43 -0.83% -1.39 -2.01% -1.59 -0.44% -0.26 0.58% -0.38 
8 2.40% 0.88 1.13% 0.07 3.08% 0.63 0.44% 0.15 -0.97% -0.86 
9 -1.65% -1.39 1.42% 1.62 -0.21% -0.85 1.66% 0.96 2.95% *1.95 
10 6.64% 1.48 2.36% 1.51 1.71% 0.54 0.38% 0.12 -1.50% -1.48 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and *** if with 
1% confidence level. 
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Panel 7.4.E – Cross effects originating from Portugal’s sovereign downgrades 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Portugal France Italy Germany Spain 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 2.53% **2.24 1.68% 1.67 0.90% 0.75 -0.09% -0.48 0.61% 0.99 
-9 1.12% 1.50 1.04% 0.67 0.45% 0.19 -0.78% -0.52 0.16% -0.08 
-8 1.66% **2.09 1.06% 0.55 0.47% 0.33 0.47% 0.68 1.16% *1.75 
-7 -1.43% -0.53 0.76% 0.07 -0.47% -0.18 -0.27% -1.13 0.23% 0.31 
-6 -0.19% 0.27 0.02% 0.54 -1.15% -0.30 -0.38% 0.11 -0.09% 0.05 
-5 0.89% 0.58 -0.15% -0.06 0.04% 0.24 -1.11% -0.07 0.30% 0.44 
-4 0.14% 0.68 -1.07% -1.03 -0.88% -0.23 -1.51% -1.00 -0.26% -0.31 
-3 0.06% 0.80 0.79% 0.34 0.93% 0.67 -1.33% -0.11 0.78% 0.73 
-2 -0.77% -1.38 -0.88% -0.37 0.00% -0.34 -1.33% -0.66 -0.49% -0.72 
-1 0.76% 0.18 -0.17% 0.33 0.61% 0.20 0.51% 0.80 -0.42% -0.13 
0 -0.42% -0.45 0.54% 0.35 -0.93% -0.83 -0.63% -0.92 -0.56% -0.44 
1 -1.31% -0.74 -0.29% -0.22 -0.56% -0.48 -0.75% -0.84 -0.57% -0.31 
2 1.01% 0.62 -1.15% *-1.70 -0.61% -0.50 -0.67% -0.32 0.30% -0.22 
3 1.38% 1.75 3.07% 1.13 -0.60% -0.82 0.05% -0.32 1.20% 0.58 
4 0.45% 0.54 1.17% 0.61 1.71% 1.33 1.41% 0.95 0.63% 1.05 
5 -1.42% -1.54 -0.40% **-2.00 -1.10% -1.42 1.53% -0.42 -0.94% -1.39 
6 -0.14% 0.34 1.21% 0.33 1.28% 0.83 0.99% 0.50 0.39% 0.61 
7 -0.05% 1.05 -0.95% -0.79 -0.76% -0.42 0.46% -0.07 0.47% 0.96 
8 0.10% -0.26 -2.45% -0.94 0.71% 0.52 -0.30% -0.03 -0.46% -0.11 
9 2.65% 1.60 4.59% 1.29 3.46% 1.39 3.27% 1.45 3.83% **2.47 
10 0.54% 1.45 1.30% 0.93 0.39% 0.39 0.21% -0.53 0.85% 0.85 
  
         
  
  Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 -0.52% -0.86 -0.18% 0.26 0.92% -0.19 2.08% *1.81 -0.35% -0.68 
-9 2.06% **2.18 0.90% 0.33 0.68% -0.05 1.28% 0.79 0.60% -0.75 
-8 2.66% ***2.66 1.46% *1.84 1.56% 0.64 3.52% ***2.70 1.06% 1.59 
-7 0.36% -0.54 -0.05% -0.59 1.60% 0.39 -1.45% -1.00 -0.88% -0.86 
-6 3.30% ***3.37 0.70% 0.86 0.13% 0.13 0.79% 1.06 0.44% -0.26 
-5 -0.91% 0.00 -0.93% -0.71 -0.87% 0.28 0.95% 0.55 0.31% 0.55 
-4 2.01% 1.10 -0.38% -0.62 -1.19% *-1.86 -0.85% -0.25 -1.22% -0.31 
-3 -0.64% 0.60 0.74% 1.17 0.35% 1.24 -0.30% 0.01 0.72% 0.87 
-2 -10.38% -1.45 -0.42% -1.02 -4.01% -0.31 0.72% 0.27 -3.28% -0.76 
-1 6.29% **2.57 -0.53% 0.28 0.06% 0.71 0.17% -0.18 1.30% 0.07 
0 -3.59% -0.79 -0.10% -0.64 0.31% 0.06 -0.07% 0.14 -0.26% -0.18 
1 -6.75% -1.43 0.13% 0.13 -1.29% -0.57 -0.61% -0.61 0.10% -0.01 
2 8.98% 1.19 1.04% 0.02 -0.47% 0.14 1.15% 0.31 -0.11% 0.25 
3 1.81% -0.07 1.47% 0.81 2.04% 0.72 2.08% 0.69 -0.22% -0.44 
4 -8.27% -0.16 1.11% ***3.30 -4.04% -0.44 0.43% -0.21 0.17% 0.70 
5 11.62% 1.46 -0.09% -1.13 0.92% -0.51 -0.59% -0.26 0.27% -0.69 
6 -2.07% 0.15 0.71% 1.00 0.65% 1.34 1.50% 0.44 -0.44% 0.58 
7 -2.17% -1.75 0.87% 0.96 0.23% -0.24 0.83% 1.16 0.47% 0.03 
8 4.42% 0.64 -0.09% -0.33 1.01% **2.52 2.58% 0.57 -1.32% -1.05 
9 1.45% -0.19 2.48% 1.52 4.22% 1.35 4.36% 1.16 1.59% 1.23 
10 6.13% 1.44 1.45% 0.82 0.93% -0.17 0.48% 0.43 2.32% 0.11 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and *** if 
with 1% confidence level. 
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Panel 7.5.A – Cross effects originating from Spain’s sovereign downgrades (shorter 
event window) 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Spain France Italy Germany Portugal 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 -0.87% -1.42 -0.57% -0.78 -0.15% 0.15 -0.74% -0.73 0.38% 0.47 
-4 -0.18% -0.38 -0.27% -1.27 -0.76% -0.80 -1.27% ***-3.03 0.08% 0.38 
-3 -0.52% -0.60 -1.18% -0.63 0.44% 0.37 -1.82% **-2.11 0.61% 0.86 
-2 0.39% 0.11 0.30% 0.34 1.02% 0.49 -1.55% -0.54 -0.81% -1.01 
-1 0.03% -0.16 1.53% 1.20 1.67% 0.65 -0.26% 0.11 1.71% ***2.67 
0 -1.24% -1.20 -0.90% -0.53 -1.40% -1.20 -1.44% -1.00 -0.38% -0.42 
1 -0.15% -0.08 -0.64% 0.34 0.45% 0.65 -0.73% -0.07 0.79% 0.63 
2 -0.36% -0.70 -0.30% -0.61 -1.08% -1.01 -0.98% -0.83 0.55% 0.28 
3 -0.48% -0.73 0.07% -0.11 -1.52% -1.57 -1.13% -1.01 -0.01% -0.28 
4 0.47% 1.15 0.77% 0.91 1.53% 0.82 1.08% 1.29 0.37% 0.59 
5 0.11% -0.83 0.59% -0.66 -1.33% -0.89 0.02% -0.52 -0.82% -1.10 
  
         
  
  Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 1.37% 1.03 0.89% 0.57 1.69% 1.14 -0.83% -0.21 0.01% 0.11 
-4 2.01% 0.63 -1.30% -1.41 -1.24% -1.29 -0.97% -0.61 0.49% 0.38 
-3 -0.43% -0.57 -0.96% -0.80 -0.15% 0.99 -1.21% 0.17 0.44% 1.54 
-2 1.99% 0.57 0.39% -0.31 0.54% 0.56 -3.12% -0.57 -0.56% -0.13 
-1 -1.54% -0.77 0.93% 0.71 -0.31% 0.27 2.24% 1.48 -0.29% 0.05 
0 -9.10% -1.31 -1.61% -1.55 -3.79% -0.15 0.44% 0.13 -3.50% -0.75 
1 4.37% 1.11 -0.82% 0.48 -1.23% 0.82 2.48% 1.45 2.71% 1.29 
2 -1.42% -0.25 -0.44% -0.70 -1.13% -0.94 -0.08% 0.99 -1.81% -1.35 
3 -1.42% -0.75 1.63% 0.89 -0.67% -0.39 0.68% 0.44 0.96% 0.89 
4 3.97% 0.78 1.41% *1.77 0.22% *1.78 1.72% 1.43 -0.95% -0.91 
5 -6.35% -1.26 0.24% -0.13 -2.62% *-1.73 1.58% 0.64 -2.18% -0.79 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level 





Panel 7.5.B – Cross effects originating from Ireland’s sovereign downgrades (shorter 
event window) 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Ireland France Italy Germany Spain 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 1.41% 0.93 1.17% 0.86 1.76% 1.04 1.97% *1.84 1.24% 1.27 
-4 3.64% 1.64 0.43% *1.83 0.82% 0.54 1.25% 0.65 1.14% **2.03 
-3 -0.68% -0.53 0.00% 0.44 -0.59% -1.14 -0.03% -1.25 -0.11% -0.75 
-2 -0.63% -0.73 -0.42% -0.84 0.98% 0.44 1.08% 0.87 0.40% 0.31 
-1 0.65% 0.90 0.26% -0.05 0.20% -0.04 2.06% *1.70 -0.06% -0.28 
0 0.65% -0.12 -0.77% -0.71 -0.02% 0.44 -2.87% -1.24 -0.30% 0.05 
1 3.65% *1.87 0.39% -0.39 1.11% 0.37 1.06% 0.44 1.30% 1.46 
2 1.96% 1.39 0.33% 0.03 0.93% 0.58 0.89% 0.65 0.10% -0.70 
3 3.01% 0.70 1.58% *1.70 1.75% 0.83 1.47% 0.67 1.82% *1.90 
4 4.94% 1.11 0.44% 0.13 0.69% -0.15 0.49% -0.24 0.63% 0.98 
5 -1.20% -0.28 -0.54% -1.20 -1.27% -1.31 -1.26% ***-2.72 -0.07% -0.15 
  
         
  
  Portugal Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 0.90% **2.13 1.04% 1.31 1.17% 0.55 2.51% 1.59 0.89% 1.01 
-4 -0.19% 0.04 0.66% 1.23 -1.00% -0.82 -0.27% -0.46 -0.80% -0.20 
-3 -0.60% -0.22 -0.53% -0.89 -0.40% -1.03 0.05% 0.25 0.07% 0.90 
-2 -0.21% 0.47 -0.75% *-1.71 0.95% -0.30 -0.60% -0.52 -0.33% -0.03 
-1 1.07% 1.10 -0.41% 0.02 2.19% 1.27 0.05% 0.09 -3.80% -1.60 
0 0.07% -0.13 -0.98% -1.03 -0.46% 0.31 -0.02% 0.18 1.98% 0.28 
1 0.39% 1.51 1.22% 0.82 0.66% 0.36 1.17% 0.74 -0.56% -0.08 
2 0.27% 0.45 1.39% 1.48 0.91% 1.41 -0.45% -0.38 1.56% 1.15 
3 1.77% *1.91 1.48% ***3.08 0.97% 1.20 2.10% 0.81 -0.84% -1.17 
4 0.89% *1.80 0.89% **2.13 1.15% *1.75 1.41% 0.66 1.70% **2.04 
5 -0.23% 0.45 -1.29% *-1.83 0.13% -0.01 -2.04% -0.93 1.69% -1.08 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence 





Panel 7.5.C – Cross effects originating from Italy’s sovereign downgrades (shorter 
event window) 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Italy France Ireland Germany Spain 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 -2.88% -1.12 -2.33% -0.70 2.77% 1.04 -2.18% -0.88 -0.43% -0.69 
-4 -0.83% -0.01 0.76% -0.19 2.15% *1.93 0.36% 0.44 -0.06% -0.03 
-3 2.06% 0.82 -0.02% -0.01 2.71% ***4.81 1.12% 1.32 2.17% *1.84 
-2 2.88% 1.41 0.31% -0.33 -6.02% -1.54 1.30% 0.99 -0.23% -0.54 
-1 2.98% 1.20 0.05% 0.45 1.62% 0.61 2.82% *1.82 0.43% 0.87 
0 1.17% 0.61 0.89% 0.84 2.05% 1.14 -1.03% -1.09 0.88% 0.90 
1 1.17% 1.08 -0.43% 0.17 0.51% 0.24 0.66% ***4.54 0.52% 1.20 
2 -1.28% -0.66 -0.01% -0.51 0.89% 1.45 0.15% 0.03 -0.32% -0.65 
3 -2.79% *-1.89 0.55% 0.26 0.47% 0.37 -1.44% -0.41 0.34% 0.28 
4 5.20% *1.76 5.58% ***3.83 7.00% **2.38 5.20% ***3.05 2.28% ***2.68 
5 0.61% 0.29 1.21% 1.30 -1.40% -0.49 1.55% 0.56 -0.23% -0.43 
  
         
  
  Portugal Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 1.50% 0.74 -0.35% -0.44 0.44% 0.39 -0.36% -0.05 0.25% 0.07 
-4 -0.37% -0.56 0.00% -0.27 -0.26% -0.41 -1.79% -1.17 0.60% 0.52 
-3 -0.05% 0.28 1.03% 1.81 3.15% *1.88 1.19% 0.59 3.06% ***3.09 
-2 -0.52% -0.03 -2.42% -0.96 1.24% 0.64 -0.38% -0.13 1.38% 1.02 
-1 3.33% 1.41 2.80% **2.18 2.53% 1.05 4.33% *1.83 0.64% 0.47 
0 0.76% 0.45 -1.08% -1.03 0.05% 0.06 1.38% 0.86 -0.88% -0.42 
1 -1.27% -0.53 1.04% 1.06 0.79% 0.49 -1.15% -0.23 -0.54% -0.39 
2 0.53% 0.20 1.01% 0.10 0.78% 0.23 0.48% 0.45 -1.07% -0.39 
3 0.82% 0.63 -0.31% -0.07 -2.33% *-1.97 3.03% 0.98 -2.24% -1.78 
4 1.37% 1.04 3.62% ***12.49 5.15% ***5.12 0.25% 0.24 1.45% 1.02 
5 -1.30% -1.56 1.42% 0.72 0.22% -0.12 -3.46% -1.65 1.38% 0.78 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level 





Panel 7.5.D – Cross effects originating from Greece’s sovereign downgrades (shorter 
event window) 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Greece France Italy Germany Portugal 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 -0.82% 0.54 1.01% 0.46 0.76% 0.22 0.93% 0.34 0.15% -1.04 
-4 -2.41% 0.71 0.48% 0.93 1.53% 1.49 -0.56% -0.43 0.05% -0.06 
-3 -2.27% -0.46 -0.49% *-1.72 -0.54% -1.10 -1.40% ***-3.56 -0.18% 0.05 
-2 2.16% 1.36 -0.35% -0.58 -0.37% -0.32 -0.42% -0.49 0.35% 1.28 
-1 -2.87% 0.28 0.66% 1.46 0.95% 1.63 0.11% 1.31 0.08% 0.53 
0 -0.77% -0.35 -1.55% *-1.81 -1.76% ***-2.78 -1.91% -1.58 -1.36% **-2.16 
1 1.75% 0.62 0.39% 0.91 0.18% 0.61 -0.15% 0.89 0.37% 0.46 
2 -1.45% 0.85 -0.15% -0.94 -0.45% -0.91 -0.39% -1.52 0.47% -0.03 
3 2.08% 0.59 -1.23% -0.38 -1.26% -1.59 -1.56% -1.29 -0.26% -0.31 
4 -2.13% -0.03 -1.05% -0.64 -0.07% 0.41 -1.52% *-1.92 0.31% 0.72 
5 3.90% 1.34 -0.22% -0.59 -0.20% -0.65 -0.42% -0.21 -0.19% 0.10 
  
         
  
  Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom Spain United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 -0.76% -0.21 0.47% -0.21 0.82% 0.53 0.58% 0.03 0.65% 1.15 
-4 -0.11% -0.34 1.19% 0.30 1.02% 0.99 0.48% 0.71 0.27% 0.18 
-3 1.03% -0.20 -0.28% *-1.72 -0.09% -0.78 -0.20% -0.55 0.00% -0.59 
-2 -0.24% -0.33 -0.45% -0.58 0.64% -0.19 -0.52% -1.01 -0.92% -1.06 
-1 1.64% 1.45 0.50% 1.23 0.83% 1.48 0.36% 1.37 0.23% -0.48 
0 -2.34% -1.57 -0.76% -0.19 -1.37% -1.42 -0.88% -1.63 -0.56% 0.14 
1 2.03% *1.78 -0.07% -0.08 0.04% 0.10 0.07% 0.29 -0.56% 0.31 
2 3.23% 1.54 -0.38% *-1.70 -1.60% -1.50 -0.48% -1.69 0.20% 0.08 
3 -4.97% -0.44 -1.77% *-1.79 -3.93% -0.38 -0.80% -0.98 -2.32% -0.53 
4 2.92% 0.86 -0.30% 0.39 -2.21% -1.84 0.02% 0.44 1.01% 0.22 
5 -2.56% *-1.97 -0.16% -0.39 -0.80% -0.78 -0.28% -0.64 -0.72% -0.62 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and 





Panel 7.5.E – Cross effects originating from Portugal’s sovereign downgrades (shorter 
event window) 
Methodology used: country blocks to compute SAR variances and test statistics. 
  Portugal France Italy Germany Spain 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 0.89% 0.42 -0.15% 0.08 0.04% 0.51 -1.11% 0.15 0.30% 0.96 
-4 0.14% 0.61 -1.07% **-2.51 -0.88% -0.45 -1.51% -1.44 -0.26% -0.52 
-3 0.06% 0.60 0.79% 0.42 0.93% 0.66 -1.33% -0.51 0.78% 1.42 
-2 -0.77% **-2.01 -0.88% -0.70 0.00% -0.39 -1.33% -1.06 -0.49% -0.72 
-1 0.76% 0.17 -0.17% 0.87 0.61% 0.40 0.51% 1.30 -0.42% -0.13 
0 -0.42% -0.60 0.54% -0.22 -0.93% -1.51 -0.63% -1.56 -0.56% -1.04 
1 -1.31% -0.93 -0.29% -0.43 -0.56% -0.67 -0.75% -1.08 -0.57% -0.73 
2 1.01% 0.45 -1.15% **-2.15 -0.61% -0.74 -0.67% -0.46 0.30% -0.28 
3 1.38% *1.70 3.07% 1.37 -0.60% -1.20 0.05% -0.92 1.20% 0.80 
4 0.45% 0.80 1.17% 1.23 1.71% 1.58 1.41% 1.35 0.63% 1.24 
5 -1.42% **-2.13 -0.40% ***-4.15 -1.10% **-2.40 1.53% -1.33 -0.94% ***-2.99 
  
         
  
  Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom Greece United States 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-5 -0.91% 0.18 -0.93% -0.52 -0.87% 0.50 0.95% 0.74 0.31% 0.78 
-4 2.01% 0.78 -0.38% -0.57 -1.19% *-1.71 -0.85% -0.61 -1.22% -0.40 
-3 -0.64% 0.52 0.74% 1.24 0.35% 1.85 -0.30% -0.16 0.72% 1.18 
-2 -10.38% -1.15 -0.42% -1.38 -4.01% -0.06 0.72% 0.84 -3.28% -0.81 
-1 6.29% **2.08 -0.53% 0.34 0.06% 0.83 0.17% -0.20 1.30% -0.25 
0 -3.59% -0.67 -0.10% -0.95 0.31% -0.15 -0.07% 0.24 -0.26% -0.27 
1 -6.75% -1.18 0.13% -0.35 -1.29% -0.77 -0.61% -0.67 0.10% 0.04 
2 8.98% 0.98 1.04% -0.08 -0.47% 0.32 1.15% 0.16 -0.11% 0.53 
3 1.81% -0.19 1.47% 1.15 2.04% 0.24 2.08% 0.98 -0.22% -0.80 
4 -8.27% -0.19 1.11% ***2.78 -4.04% -1.12 0.43% -0.18 0.17% 1.21 
5 11.62% 1.13 -0.09% -1.81 0.92% -0.79 -0.59% -0.30 0.27% -1.10 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% confidence level and *** 
if with 1% confidence level.  
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Appendix 8 – Results for Q3 (Other bank’s rating changes) 
Panel 8.1 - Reaction of other banks in the same country (average abnormal returns, 
cumulative abnormal return and respective t-statistics), by country, following a bank 
downgrade 
Methodology: simple scaled abnormal returns and cross-sectional variance (without country or day 
blocks). In the cases where more than one bank was downgraded in the same country in the same 
day, all event banks were excluded, only non-event banks remained. Ireland could not be analysed 
since it has only one bank; Germany has only one bank rating downgrade and was excluded as well. 
 
  France Greece Italy Portugal 
# obs 13 25 42 5 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 0.11% 0.92 -0.89% -0.68 1.96% **2.26 0.73% 0.64 
-9 1.00% 0.59 0.76% 0.75 1.16% **2.26 1.35% 1.18 
-8 2.32% 1.81 -0.41% -0.11 -0.49% -0.42 1.18% **2.62 
-7 0.42% 1.06 -1.89% -0.84 -0.05% -0.20 -0.45% -0.77 
-6 -1.75% -0.81 0.67% 0.50 3.02% ***2.99 0.19% 0.40 
-5 2.85% 1.61 0.51% 0.28 0.56% 0.22 0.22% 0.24 
-4 1.05% 0.34 -0.68% -0.48 1.72% **2.46 -1.54% -1.18 
-3 -0.28% -0.17 -0.73% -0.63 0.84% 1.03 0.97% 0.61 
-2 2.94% 1.27 0.97% 0.59 0.99% **2.45 -0.14% -1.51 
-1 1.76% 1.18 3.96% *1.79 0.00% 0.14 -2.15% -0.30 
0 0.30% -0.90 0.87% 0.54 0.70% 0.98 0.32% 0.08 
1 -0.21% -0.59 3.06% *1.82 0.69% 0.21 0.41% -0.10 
2 0.44% 0.25 2.29% 1.04 0.14% -0.08 0.75% 0.75 
3 -0.32% 0.50 -0.50% -0.05 1.86% 1.01 0.54% 0.42 
4 -1.88% **-2.20 2.65% 1.62 2.30% ***3.26 1.75% 1.27 
5 1.51% 1.04 1.46% 1.10 0.65% 0.88 6.71% ***4.95 
6 0.50% 0.98 0.42% 0.33 1.01% 1.48 3.56% 1.18 
7 2.36% 1.38 1.09% 0.37 0.22% 0.02 0.22% 1.10 
8 0.23% 0.03 0.40% 0.54 -0.12% 0.42 -1.40% ***-7.14 
9 1.08% 0.77 4.31% **2.83 1.01% 0.56 1.09% 1.01 
10 1.29% *1.82 -0.45% -0.44 0.35% 0.47 -0.86% -0.64 
  
       
  
  France Greece Italy Portugal 
# obs 13 25 42 5 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.28% -0.47 -0.73% -0.71 0.84% 0.73 0.97% 1.06 
-2 2.66% 1.03 0.24% -0.34 1.83% *1.79 0.83% 1.35 
-1 4.42% 1.47 4.19% 0.85 1.84% 1.28 -1.33% -0.31 
0 4.71% *1.68 5.06% 0.68 2.54% 1.56 -1.01% -0.35 
1 4.50% 0.78 8.12% 1.13 3.23% *1.69 -0.60% -0.72 
2 4.94% 1.28 10.40% *1.68 3.37% 1.60 0.16% 0.48 
3 4.63% 0.88 9.90% 1.61 5.23% 2.05 0.70% 0.63 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 
5% confidence level and *** if with 1% confidence level. 





  Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
# obs 60 4 17 338 
Day AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB AR tAB 
-10 0.25% 0.39 0.58% -0.34 -2.16% -1.50 -2.34% **-2.01 
-9 1.40% *1.82 -2.22% -0.70 0.35% 0.10 2.12% **2.28 
-8 -0.82% -0.68 2.02% 1.13 2.93% 1.50 -1.89% -1.41 
-7 0.66% **2.25 -4.38% -1.21 4.23% ***3.45 1.72% 0.53 
-6 -0.70% **-2.38 1.09% 1.48 0.79% 0.28 -0.25% -0.22 
-5 0.18% -0.32 -4.00% -1.23 -4.95% **-2.01 0.36% 0.02 
-4 0.36% 0.66 4.13% 0.73 0.10% -0.17 0.25% 0.61 
-3 0.70% 1.34 2.30% 1.46 0.15% -0.26 1.41% 0.68 
-2 -0.25% -0.29 -0.82% 0.40 -0.35% -0.60 0.52% 0.84 
-1 0.44% 0.79 1.22% 1.24 -2.66% -0.91 0.42% 0.53 
0 0.68% 0.97 3.56% 1.23 -4.94% -1.63 -2.47% -1.05 
1 -0.52% -0.45 -1.20% -1.22 0.20% -0.03 3.51% **2.31 
2 0.39% 0.54 -1.00% -0.85 1.41% 0.53 0.16% -0.05 
3 1.05% ***2.68 3.23% **2.29 -8.87% -1.35 -0.20% 0.37 
4 1.14% **2.03 -2.10% ***-2.88 -3.38% -1.00 0.85% 0.25 
5 0.86% 1.67 0.57% 1.58 2.35% 1.00 1.35% 0.53 
6 0.28% 0.08 -2.43% -0.89 1.56% 0.77 1.37% 1.11 
7 0.76% 1.15 -1.37% -0.14 -3.21% -1.08 -0.77% -0.82 
8 -0.16% -0.06 1.77% 1.21 2.02% -0.03 -0.57% 0.02 
9 0.16% 0.40 1.19% 0.49 2.69% 1.28 1.80% 0.88 
10 0.25% 0.75 1.34% 0.93 4.51% 1.14 -1.01% 0.19 
  
       
  
  Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States 
# obs 60 4 17 338 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.70% 0.10 2.30% 1.31 0.15% -0.29 1.41% 0.81 
-2 0.45% 0.12 1.48% 1.61 -0.20% -0.24 1.93% 1.12 
-1 0.89% 0.16 2.70% **1.99 -2.86% -0.69 2.34% 1.23 
0 1.57% 0.24 6.26% ***2.64 -7.80% -1.14 -0.13% 0.39 
1 1.05% 0.12 5.07% **2.21 -7.60% -1.22 3.38% *1.72 
2 1.44% 0.25 4.07% 0.78 -6.19% -0.49 3.54% 1.35 
3 2.49% 0.94 7.30% **2.08 -15.07% -1.04 3.34% 1.54 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 





Panel 8.2.A - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in the United Kingdom 
Number of bank downgrades in the United Kingdom: 11 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 7 
 
  Spain Ireland Italy Greece Portugal 
# obs 35 7 35 42 21 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.14% -0.51 -0.26% -0.38 -0.17% 0.06 -0.97% -0.29 -1.15% -1.28 
-2 1.33% -0.04 1.13% 0.53 -0.82% -0.35 -1.33% -0.51 -0.15% -0.17 
-1 1.51% 0.10 -4.84% -0.50 -2.06% -0.54 -1.25% -0.09 0.76% 0.64 
0 1.39% -0.12 -3.32% -0.47 -4.52% -1.45 -2.36% -0.50 -0.09% -0.09 
1 2.32% 0.14 2.92% 0.09 -4.10% -1.26 -0.45% -0.12 -0.59% -0.59 
2 4.03% 0.41 -0.25% -0.82 -1.47% -0.19 2.69% 1.07 1.07% 0.43 
3 4.00% 0.36 -13.10% -1.30 -1.07% -0.09 2.08% 0.66 2.44% 0.58 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 119 14 14 21 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -1.27% 0.42 -0.10% 0.62 -1.41% -0.52 -0.43% -1.08 
-2 -2.20% 0.34 -1.60% 0.35 -1.07% -0.31 -0.94% -1.31 
-1 -5.13% 0.11 -3.20% 0.15 -2.75% -0.71 -1.12% -1.14 
0 -7.32% 0.10 -6.43% -0.54 -4.37% -1.27 -3.05% *-1.69 
1 -3.51% 0.45 -5.30% -0.28 -7.18% **-2.15 -3.12% -1.53 
2 2.61% 0.47 -2.04% 0.09 -4.99% -1.32 -1.20% -0.97 
3 1.28% 0.09 -1.92% 0.50 -3.65% -1.11 -0.42% -0.80 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 






Panel 8.2.B - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in Spain 
Number of bank downgrades in Spain: 37 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 15 
 
  United Kingdom Ireland Italy Greece Portugal 
# obs 60 15 75 90 45 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.57% 0.72 -2.97% -1.22 1.56% 1.14 -0.39% 0.03 0.57% 0.79 
-2 -0.87% 0.80 -0.05% 0.02 0.70% 0.21 0.97% 1.16 -0.10% -0.01 
-1 -0.65% 0.96 -1.10% -0.29 1.03% 0.47 -1.28% 0.27 -0.32% -0.12 
0 -0.39% 1.08 -0.84% -0.02 1.08% 0.56 -1.49% 0.50 0.07% 0.21 
1 -0.28% 1.01 -1.73% -0.01 1.59% 0.80 -0.62% 0.76 -0.11% 0.28 
2 -1.78% 0.47 -0.61% -0.73 0.80% 0.14 -2.94% -0.32 -0.03% 0.28 
3 -3.00% 0.43 1.41% 0.00 1.50% 0.24 -2.63% -0.05 -0.06% 0.00 
 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 255 30 30 45 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.73% 0.89 -0.02% 0.82 -0.06% 0.57 1.56% 2.09 
-2 -0.07% 0.40 -0.71% 0.61 -1.01% 0.41 1.38% 1.60 
-1 0.85% 1.04 -0.43% 0.51 -0.66% 0.28 0.80% 0.86 
0 0.10% 0.50 0.30% 0.93 0.40% 0.62 1.01% 0.88 
1 1.40% 0.97 0.71% 0.84 -0.43% 0.24 0.61% 0.70 
2 0.41% -0.03 -0.14% 0.48 -1.15% 0.14 0.44% 0.44 
3 1.37% 0.52 -0.87% 0.26 -1.72% 0.04 0.98% 0.77 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 







Panel 8.2.C - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in Ireland 
Number of bank downgrades in Ireland: 7 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 7 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Italy Greece Portugal 
# obs 28 35 35 42 21 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.17% -0.13 -0.27% -0.32 0.54% 0.21 -0.62% -0.30 0.87% 0.64 
-2 1.22% 0.14 1.08% 0.92 1.33% 0.30 0.54% 0.04 1.04% 0.64 
-1 2.09% 0.31 1.74% 0.93 1.80% 0.52 2.35% 0.64 1.46% 0.80 
0 2.44% 0.13 2.39% 0.96 2.73% 1.00 3.59% 1.05 2.34% 1.05 
1 1.79% 0.21 2.07% 0.56 2.36% 0.37 4.07% 0.71 2.35% 0.67 
2 0.27% -0.47 1.61% 0.26 1.88% 0.18 2.69% 0.16 3.24% 0.99 
3 0.30% 0.20 2.05% 0.56 1.96% 0.27 3.43% 0.65 4.07% 1.57 
 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 119 14 14 21 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.41% -0.01 -0.70% -1.17 -0.31% -0.81 -0.15% 0.63 
-2 -0.65% -0.94 0.02% -0.42 -0.45% -1.08 -0.64% -0.27 
-1 1.14% 0.41 0.87% -0.33 0.02% -0.79 -0.43% -0.79 
0 -0.80% -0.75 0.95% -0.14 0.44% -0.51 -0.04% -0.52 
1 0.39% 0.16 1.51% 1.14 1.02% -0.26 -0.07% -1.04 
2 -0.76% -0.36 1.63% 0.03 0.47% -0.71 -0.33% *-1.85 
3 -0.15% 0.01 1.10% -0.08 0.91% -0.52 -1.57% **-2.48 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 






Panel 8.2.D - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in Italy 
Number of bank downgrades in Italy: 25 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 13 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Greece Portugal 
# obs 52 65 13 78 39 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.91% 0.38 0.75% 0.58 1.56% -0.01 2.40% 0.83 1.87% 1.09 
-2 1.26% 0.11 1.50% 0.83 5.35% 0.88 5.19% 1.61 3.09% *1.81 
-1 2.58% 0.39 1.51% 0.88 2.88% 0.40 4.79% 1.21 2.76% 1.60 
0 2.87% 0.19 1.51% 0.61 4.66% 0.75 5.05% 1.16 2.60% 1.54 
1 4.65% 0.59 2.25% 0.76 5.82% 1.18 6.33% 1.14 2.84% 1.51 
2 4.75% 0.55 1.98% 0.61 6.92% 0.88 4.38% 0.73 1.75% 1.36 
3 6.07% 0.72 3.18% 1.08 8.24% 1.14 5.43% 1.16 1.88% 1.51 
 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 221 26 26 39 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.83% 0.67 0.95% 0.87 1.42% 1.24 0.10% 0.17 
-2 0.53% 0.24 0.78% 0.04 2.88% 1.01 1.17% 0.73 
-1 0.62% 0.08 1.36% 0.61 4.17% 1.64 1.50% 0.90 
0 1.70% 0.37 1.11% 0.28 4.18% 1.40 0.79% 0.26 
1 0.43% -0.15 0.71% 0.41 5.41% 1.55 1.50% 0.43 
2 1.56% 0.31 0.69% 0.35 4.85% 1.37 1.80% 0.64 
3 4.57% 0.84 2.54% 1.39 7.12% **2.42 3.20% 1.05 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 







Panel 8.2.E - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in Greece 
Number of bank downgrades in Greece: 33 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 9 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Portugal 
# obs 36 45 9 45 27 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 1.19% 0.81 -0.33% -0.33 -1.56% -1.05 -0.34% -0.50 -1.02% -1.01 
-2 2.35% 1.09 0.27% -0.13 -2.18% ***-2.99 -0.73% -1.08 -0.80% -1.23 
-1 2.73% 1.33 1.30% 0.39 -2.50% **-2.16 0.26% -0.38 -0.66% -1.45 
0 2.48% 0.18 0.82% 0.19 1.11% **-2.56 0.63% -0.41 -1.77% **-2.44 
1 2.21% 0.38 0.84% 0.06 9.49% -0.61 0.20% -0.86 -1.69% *-1.92 
2 2.31% 0.47 1.92% 0.80 12.83% 0.59 0.94% -0.47 0.50% -0.89 
3 2.57% -0.01 2.23% 1.01 13.45% 0.88 1.41% -0.16 1.36% -1.01 
 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 153 18 18 27 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.01% 1.22 -0.38% -0.19 -0.48% -0.63 -0.59% -1.05 
-2 0.28% 0.94 0.14% -0.07 -1.14% -1.06 -1.55% **-2.26 
-1 0.99% 1.05 1.40% 0.43 0.18% 0.38 -0.74% -0.74 
0 -0.49% 0.29 0.45% -0.36 0.54% -0.19 -1.90% *-1.86 
1 -0.41% 0.58 0.31% -0.41 0.44% -0.30 -1.90% *-1.82 
2 -0.70% 0.85 0.69% -0.40 1.16% -0.23 -1.12% -1.29 
3 -0.91% 0.92 1.34% -0.18 1.96% -0.20 -1.37% -1.03 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 





Panel 8.2.F - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in Portugal 
Number of bank downgrades in Portugal: 23 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 10 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Greece 
# obs 36 45 9 45 33 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.82% 1.01 0.31% 0.80 1.46% 0.87 0.05% -0.31 1.56% 0.25 
-2 0.85% 0.78 0.65% 1.09 -0.37% 0.35 -0.55% -0.57 0.47% -0.37 
-1 1.10% 0.85 0.82% 1.12 -2.15% 0.18 -0.22% -0.20 3.68% 0.46 
0 0.27% 0.15 0.07% 0.26 -0.13% 0.08 -0.57% -0.52 2.93% 0.02 
1 0.67% 0.41 0.46% 0.58 2.86% 0.20 -0.86% -0.76 2.20% -0.38 
2 1.34% 0.56 0.50% 0.67 4.04% 0.46 0.51% -0.16 4.28% 0.34 
3 1.09% 0.23 0.22% 0.15 9.44% 0.89 0.03% -0.26 3.48% 0.22 
 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 153 18 18 27 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -1.19% -0.89 -0.24% -0.17 0.66% 0.57 0.38% 0.46 
-2 -1.48% -0.30 -0.95% -0.50 -0.39% -0.11 -0.83% -0.21 
-1 -1.97% -0.24 -0.79% -0.20 0.07% 0.05 -1.71% -0.33 
0 -2.40% -0.58 -1.51% -1.04 -0.77% -0.59 -3.20% -1.18 
1 -2.42% -0.83 -0.77% -0.66 -1.39% -0.74 -2.05% -0.67 
2 -0.90% 0.30 -0.19% -0.28 -0.61% -0.34 -1.14% -0.23 
3 0.62% 0.46 -0.11% -0.29 -1.21% -0.59 -0.70% -0.28 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 






Panel 8.2.G - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in the United States 
Number of bank downgrades in the United States: 53 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 23 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Greece 
# obs 92 115 23 115 138 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 1.01% 0.76 0.49% 0.05 0.08% -0.63 0.42% -0.66 0.39% -0.27 
-2 0.76% 0.69 0.53% 0.24 -0.69% -0.72 0.69% -0.72 1.86% 0.25 
-1 0.98% 0.94 1.56% 0.55 -1.74% -0.47 2.35% 0.49 3.48% 0.57 
0 1.07% 0.73 2.35% 0.52 1.30% -0.20 3.10% 0.03 4.34% 0.30 
1 2.83% 1.14 4.33% 1.38 8.34% 0.75 5.53% 0.43 7.29% 1.16 
2 2.41% 1.05 4.83% 1.08 6.06% 0.17 6.01% -0.29 9.35% 1.47 
3 3.13% 1.49 5.02% 1.10 12.83% 0.67 7.01% 0.92 9.91% 1.53 
 
 
  Portugal Switzerland Germany France 
# obs 69 46 46 69 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.10% 0.56 1.81% 1.41 0.51% -0.02 1.34% 0.90 
-2 0.62% 0.73 3.13% 1.59 0.47% -0.16 1.64% 0.78 
-1 1.02% 0.90 3.59% 1.24 0.29% -0.42 2.53% 1.43 
0 1.39% 1.11 3.25% 1.44 0.30% -0.29 3.49% 1.45 
1 2.07% 2.15 4.48% 1.67 0.83% -0.13 5.52% 1.55 
2 2.19% 1.45 4.45% 1.69 -0.25% -0.75 5.66% 1.27 
3 3.05% *1.86 5.10% **2.50 0.93% -0.13 5.69% 1.39 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 





Panel 8.2.H - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in the Switzerland 
Number of bank downgrades in Switzerland: 6 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 5 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Greece 
# obs 20 25 5 25 30 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 1.50% 1.40 -0.02% -0.23 1.07% 0.60 1.75% 1.46 0.56% 0.35 
-2 2.66% 1.34 1.26% 0.50 -2.84% 0.07 1.27% 1.05 0.31% 0.55 
-1 2.41% 1.41 1.56% 0.49 -9.17% -1.28 1.52% 1.05 -1.26% 0.29 
0 4.11% 1.30 1.80% 0.44 -10.73% -1.03 2.37% 1.12 -2.51% 0.38 
1 4.52% 1.14 1.59% 0.40 -5.50% -0.44 1.58% 1.04 -2.99% 0.10 
2 5.19% 1.43 1.67% 0.43 -7.55% **-2.05 2.44% 1.58 -2.67% 0.15 
3 6.60% **2.18 1.96% 0.69 -6.06% -0.91 2.96% **2.02 -2.21% 0.45 
 
 
  Portugal United States Germany France 
# obs 15 85 10 15 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -1.42% -0.86 1.75% 0.37 1.12% 0.68 0.97% 0.50 
-2 -0.31% -0.17 2.34% 0.37 0.27% 1.09 -1.71% 0.04 
-1 0.81% 0.29 3.89% 0.81 0.16% 0.88 -1.45% 0.12 
0 1.16% 0.12 3.91% 0.62 2.26% 1.33 -1.57% 0.12 
1 0.11% -0.73 4.33% 0.91 0.75% 0.94 -3.72% -0.30 
2 -0.26% -1.46 3.84% 0.77 1.96% 0.99 -2.55% -0.37 
3 2.28% 0.03 3.04% 0.69 5.83% **2.57 1.17% 0.50 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 





Panel 8.2.I - Reaction of banks abroad (average cumulative abnormal return and t-
statistic), by country, following a bank downgrade in France 
Number of bank downgrades in France: 11 
Number of corresponding dates (and events): 8 
 
  United Kingdom Spain Ireland Italy Greece 
# obs 32 40 8 40 24 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 -0.43% 0.60 -0.22% -0.59 6.92% 1.45 1.58% 1.30 0.68% 0.02 
-2 5.20% *1.74 1.78% 1.01 17.15% ***3.23 3.79% **2.02 5.17% 0.78 
-1 5.34% 1.42 2.82% 1.48 20.64% **2.51 4.61% ***2.70 6.70% 0.66 
0 7.35% 1.03 3.70% 0.79 25.49% **2.38 6.11% *1.78 8.58% 0.74 
1 6.73% 0.61 4.11% 1.01 20.55% *1.74 6.33% 1.43 6.55% 0.36 
2 8.14% 0.87 4.52% 1.10 20.43% *1.77 8.10% *1.67 8.17% 0.51 
3 7.66% 1.12 4.37% 0.94 24.53% **1.99 8.15% *1.85 10.53% 0.70 
 
 
  United States Switzerland Germany Portugal 
# obs 136 16 16 27 
Day CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB CAR tAB 
-3 0.59% 1.16 0.47% -0.22 0.70% 1.07 1.76% **2.00 
-2 0.71% 1.03 2.36% 0.32 2.90% 1.02 2.78% **2.47 
-1 0.89% 1.47 2.99% 0.56 3.93% 1.28 3.14% **2.19 
0 1.51% 1.68 4.89% 0.58 6.76% 0.71 4.26% **2.20 
1 0.54% 0.78 4.95% 0.83 5.98% 0.77 5.43% ***2.63 
2 1.48% 1.28 5.55% 1.19 7.33% 1.31 4.87% *1.76 
3 0.95% 0.88 5.48% **2.25 7.40% 1.44 5.58% **2.51 
 
T-stats suggesting significant results are marked as * if with 10% confidence level, ** if with 5% 
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